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LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE              
PUBLIC INTEREST 
JASON M. WILSON 
In the United States, public interest organizations play a vital role in 
promoting access to justice and private enforcement of the law.  Nevertheless, 
these organizations face considerable financial constraints in litigating for 
their causes.  While the non-profit sector and private bar provide 
commendable support through grants and pro bono assistance, this Comment 
suggests that this financing model does not adequately meet the needs of 
organizations that undertake expensive litigation efforts on behalf of their 
clients.  In an effort to alleviate this burden, this Comment puts forth an 
alternative model of funding public interest litigation by merging social 
entrepreneurship with the newly revitalized practice of litigation finance.  
Specifically, it proposes that a litigation financing firm organize as a benefit 
corporation to provide funding for public interest litigation in exchange for a 
share of any monetary relief generated.  This arrangement has the potential 
to pair a growing community of investors interested in making a social 
impact with plaintiffs of worthwhile causes, and in the process, ensure 
greater access to justice and private enforcement of the law.  Additionally, it 
may invigorate a growing litigation finance sector to fund cases that it has 




                                                          
 * Senior Staff, American University Law Review, Volume 64; J.D. Candidate, May 
2015, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Political Science, 2012, 
Susquehanna University.  Many thanks to Professor Leff for his encouragement and 
guidance on a number of earlier drafts.  I also sincerely appreciate all of the hard 
work by the American University Law Review.  Lastly, I cannot stress enough the love 
and support of my family, friends, and Emily, who make it all possible. 
WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  8:10 PM 
386 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:385 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ........................................................................................ 386 
 I. The Status Quo:  Underfunded Public Interest Litigation 
in a Private Enforcement Legal Regime.................................. 391 
A. The Emergence of Public Interest Litigation and 
Private Enforcement of the Law ....................................... 392 
B. Impact Litigation and the Backlash Against Public 
Interest Organizations ....................................................... 395 
C. Making Matters Worse:  The Supreme Court’s 
Limiting of Attorneys’ Fees in Buckhannon .................... 399 
 II. Two Possible Models for Funding Public Interest Litigation ... 400 
A. The Non-Profit Donor Model ........................................... 401 
B. The For-Profit Litigation Finance Model ......................... 407 
1. The exclusion of public interest organizations:  An 
incentives problem ....................................................... 411 
2. An uncertain regulatory scheme:  Broader legal 
concerns for the industry ............................................ 417 
 III. Social Entrepreneurship:  The Middle Ground Between 
For-Profit and Non-Profit Solutions to Social Problems ........ 423 
A. The Benefit Corporation Model Legislation ................... 426 
B. The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Statute .......... 429 
 IV. The Legal Feasibility and Policy Benefits of a Social 
Enterprise Model of Financing Public Interest Litigation ..... 432 
A. Public Interest Litigation Financing as a Social 
Enterprise Model ............................................................... 433 
B. The Advantages of the Delaware Public         
Benefit Corporation ........................................................ 440 
1. The specific benefit as an enforcement mechanism .. 440 
2. Signaling ....................................................................... 442 
3. Optional third-party assessment .................................. 442 
4. The benefit report is not public .................................. 443 
5. Delaware law treatment of general corporate partners ... 445 
C. The Public Policy Benefits ................................................ 447 
1. Realigning incentives between funder and plaintiff .. 448 
2. Promoting a better regulatory regime for 
litigation finance ........................................................ 451 
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 453 
Appendix ............................................................................................. 455 
Diagram A ................................................................................. 455 
Diagram B ................................................................................. 455 
INTRODUCTION 
So much of what lawyers do depends on the resources of their 
clients—a reality that seems obvious to practitioners today.  Yet, the 
United States has largely failed to address, or even make inroads in, 
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“the problem of access to justice.”1  One estimate offers a particularly 
bleak portrayal of the issue:  out of the 45 million low-income 
individuals eligible for legal aid, there are only five to six thousand 
lawyers available to serve their legal needs.2  Meanwhile, 
commentators continue to call upon the profession to make a greater 
pro bono commitment,3 and current proposals aimed at expanding 
access often fail to provide an adequate level of reform.4 
Nevertheless, public interest organizations play a considerable role 
in promoting access to justice in our legal system.5  Whether it is 
through direct legal aid services or impact litigation cases, public 
interest organizations, by definition, “advance the interests and 
causes of constituencies that are disadvantaged in the private market 
or the political process relative to more powerful social actors.”6  The 
United States often recognizes such interests by embracing private 
enforcement of the law—that is, Congress frequently authorizes its 
citizens to enforce statutory rights and regulatory objectives through 
                                                          
 1. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary:  The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest 
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 213 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 211. 
 3. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply?  A Comparative Assessment 
of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 152 
(2010) (noting that access to justice issues in the United States are often framed as 
an ethical failure on the part of lawyers to provide legal services to the poor but 
contending that a stronger pro bono commitment from practicing attorneys would 
do little to meet the actual demand for legal services). 
 4. See Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TUL. L. REV. 727, 729 
(2014) (reviewing a number of proposals aimed at increasing access to justice but 
ultimately calling for reform in legal education through accredited “new ‘public 
interest academies’ [that] could offer a low-cost path for students intending to 
practice public interest law”). 
 5. The term “public interest organization” raises a definitional issue.  For 
purposes here, a “public interest organization” is a “nonprofit tax-exempt group[] 
that attempt[s] to use law to achieve social objectives.”  Deborah L. Rhode, Public 
Interest Law:  The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2029 (2008).  This 
narrows the type of legal practice discussed in this article to exclude other lawyers 
who may try to influence policy or create social change through litigation.  See 
Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause:  How Public Interest 
Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 62, 71–72 (2014) [hereinafter Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause] 
(distinguishing public interest organizations from a broader category of “cause 
lawyering,” which may include pro bono work in private practice and other kinds of 
for-profit lawyering). 
 6. Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
506, 523 (2012). 
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private rights of action.7  Much of the time, public interest 
organizations provide the necessary legal representation for these 
citizens to vindicate their claims.8 
 However, public interest organizations face financial challenges 
that make it difficult to fully improve access to justice and promote 
private enforcement of the law.  A number of scholars surveying the 
field have found that direct legal service providers lack resources,9 
and even the most well-funded groups operate with budgets that fail 
to allow for lasting and meaningful reform.10  These constraints are 
often due to inadequate sources of funding for the organizations’ 
activities,11 with a large part of their budgets consumed by expensive 
litigation efforts.12  This resource-constrained public interest sector, 
                                                          
 7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney] (noting that in contrast to other countries, a private enforcement regime in 
the United States occupies various areas of the law, including antitrust, securities, 
environmental, mass tort, and employment discrimination). 
 8. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 
43–44 (2012) (asserting that public interest organizations, like the NAACP and 
ACLU, are “the driving force behind large-scale public law adjudication,” as they 
frequently finance and represent litigants in “litigation challenging racial 
segregation, restrictions on free speech, and invasions of privacy” (internal footnotes 
omitted)); see also Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 66 
(discussing how public interest organizations emerged with the explicit purpose to 
enforce private rights of action throughout the 1960s and 1970s, especially in 
environmental law). 
 9. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2042 (identifying how “direct service providers 
and human rights organizations face the most obvious and painful reminders of the 
overwhelming demand [for legal services] and [have] limited capacity to meet it”). 
 10. See id. (emphasizing survey results indicating that the “richest” public interest 
organizations, such as environmental groups with multimillion dollar budgets, 
reported financial constraints while facing large-scale global issues and well-funded 
opponents).  For example, the President of the Natural Resources Defense 
Council “acknowledged that her organization was better off than others in terms 
of ‘public and financial support, but the scale of the [environmental] problem is 
so much greater and the lack of a national strategy on issues like global warming 
is [more] appalling.’”  Id. 
 11. See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation:  Insights 
from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 649 (2009) (asserting that nearly 
all public interest organizations reported challenges in raising funds for their 
activities); see also infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (attributing the sizeable 
reduction in public interest organizations’ funding to a number of trends, with the end-
result being a selective use of expensive impact litigation to enforce substantive rights). 
 12. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing survey findings that 
indicate 90% of public interest organizations bring impact litigation cases that 
constitute a considerable portion of their expenses). 
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when paired with a legal system already lacking adequate access to 
justice, raises the prospect that the law is enforced with much less 
vigor than would otherwise be expected.  In turn, the financial 
mechanisms available to fund public interest organizations become 
all the more important. 
Recently, the United States has seen a renewed interest in finance 
that is both for-profit and socially motivated.  While these “social 
entrepreneurs” are not a unanimous or uniform group,13 many of 
them agree that funding social causes is too often a purely non-profit 
endeavor, but also recognize that traditional business entities often 
focus exclusively on profit and shareholder value.14  Instead, social 
entrepreneurs advocate a middle ground:  socially- and profit-
motivated financing for worthwhile causes through mechanisms such 
as crowdfunding, microfinance, social enterprise, impact investing, 
and the social impact bond.15  Certainly, each solution has its own 
proponent in what is sometimes a competitive debate,16 and critics 
often dispute the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms.17  
Nevertheless, social entrepreneurs bring a new perspective on a 
range of important issues. 
 Thus far, however, little effort has been put towards alleviating the 
financial constraints faced by public interest organizations.  This is 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate 
Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011) (discussing how the 
social entrepreneurship movement is distinct, yet closely related to the corporate 
social responsibility movement that emphasizes transparency and corporate 
reporting to third parties). 
 14. See, e.g., Dan Pallotta, The Laws of Money and Meaning, HBR BLOG NETWORK 
(Nov. 13, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2012/11/the-laws-of-money-and-
meaning (decrying the “false tenets” that define how the United States addresses 
social issues and the “either/or proposition[] [that] [e]ither you go into charity and 
give up money, or you go into business and give up meaning”). 
 15. See generally J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master:  Social Enterprise, 
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (providing 
an overview of the recent move towards social enterprise and the availability of 
financing for such entities). 
 16. See, e.g., Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law:  A 
Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the 
Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 708 (2013) (responding to 
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of microcredit, and his critique on social enterprise 
that argues the organization’s social mission will inevitably become secondary to profit). 
 17. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper:  
A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1522 (2013) 
(contending that social enterprises, such as benefit corporations, may abandon their 
social purpose because “[u]nlike charities and for-profit entities, social enterprises 
cannot rely on external actors to enforce their respective social missions”). 
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somewhat surprising because the current financing model for these 
organizations remains dominated by the very same assumptions that 
social entrepreneurs call into question in other areas.  For decades, 
the non-profit sector has been the home to the public interest 
practice—philanthropic foundations provide grants to various 
organizations, and private law firms offer a helping hand in the form 
of pro bono time.18  This model, however, often comes up short in 
addressing the needs of public interest organizations in pursuing 
strategic litigation.19  Meanwhile, for-profit litigation finance—the 
practice of funding the costs of litigation in return for a share in the 
proceeds from any settlement or judgment20—offers little promise to 
expand into public interest law as it becomes more prevalent in 
commercial litigation.21  In an effort to establish a legally feasible 
alternative, this Comment proposes that a litigation financing firm 
organize as a social enterprise to provide funding for public interest 
litigation in return for a share of any monetary relief awarded.  Such 
an entity has the potential to pair a growing group of impact investors 
interested in making a social and monetary return with claimholders 
of compelling cases, and in doing so, provide much-needed financing 
to public interest organizations.  This arrangement may also go a long 
way towards better regulation of a growing litigation finance industry. 
Part I of this Comment describes how, public interest organizations 
have historically provided the necessary legal representation for 
disadvantaged litigants to enforce private rights of action in the 
United States legal system.  This part also describes how, despite 
serving this important function, these same organizations came to 
experience considerable financial constraints.  Part II then explains 
that public interest organizations currently rely on a non-profit donor 
                                                          
 18. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 74 
(discussing how public interest organizations fund their activities through a mix of 
foundational grants, pro bono assistance from the private bar, and state and federal 
support).  Often, these donors will not fund certain causes—for instance, Albiston & 
Nielsen explain that private law firms often sponsor fellowships that flow to anti-
poverty and civil rights organizations, but not those that focus on controversial 
environmental issues.  Id. at 79. 
 19. See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of the 
non-profit donor model of funding public interest litigation). 
 20. See The Basics, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/litigation-
finance/the-basics (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (providing a definition of litigation 
financing and various different financial arrangements aimed at funding lawsuits in 
exchange for a monetary return). 
 21. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (contending that litigation financing firms do not 
pursue public interest litigation because of a lack of incentives and an uncertain 
regulatory regime). 
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model of financing public interest litigation, while an alternative for-
profit model of litigation financing provides little assistance to their 
efforts.  Part III then steps back to describe how social entrepreneurs 
challenge the non-profit and for-profit binary that defines how we 
address a variety of social issues, paying particular attention to the 
benefit corporation as the most likely social enterprise to provide 
concrete results in this endeavor.  Part IV concludes by proposing a 
social enterprise model whereby a litigation financing firm organizes 
as a public benefit corporation under Delaware law with the purpose 
of funding public interest cases.  The public policy advantages of this 
enterprise are explored as well. 
I. THE STATUS QUO:  UNDERFUNDED PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
IN A PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LEGAL REGIME 
Three developments are particularly pertinent to understanding 
the importance of public interest organizations and their financial 
constraints.  First, at the same time as the public interest movement 
took hold and major civil rights legislation was enacted, the United 
States embraced a legal regime that relied on litigants to bring suit to 
enforce their rights through a private right of action.22  Crucially, this 
model, as it was implemented in other statutory and regulatory 
frameworks, incentivized such litigation by providing attorneys’ fees 
for those who brought successful suits.23  Second, public interest 
organizations initially provided the legal representation for these 
litigants, but due to budgetary concerns, the organizations shifted 
towards bringing impact litigation as their prime means of alleviating 
the social ills that the private rights of action sought to alleviate.24  
Third, despite the potential for attorneys’ fees to incentivize public 
interest organizations to bring suit, the Supreme Court limited the 
availability of attorneys’ fees in litigation.25  Ultimately, each of these 
developments contributed to today’s inapposite status quo:  the United 
States relies on private enforcement of the law, but there is a lack of 
available capital to incentivize the attorneys who bring such litigation. 
                                                          
 22. See infra Part I.A (detailing the history of public interest law and tracing it to 
the Civil Rights Movement’s embrace of a private right of action). 
 23. Infra Part I.A. 
 24. See infra Part I.B (discussing the backlash against public interest organizations 
and their funding problems). 
 25. See infra Part I.C (detailing the Supreme Court’s decision to disallow an 
award for attorneys’ fees in cases that did not result in a court order). 
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A. The Emergence of Public Interest Litigation and Private Enforcement 
of the Law 
The public interest movement in the United States began with the 
work of the NAACP’s test case strategy employed during the 1950s.26  
By assembling financing from various donors,27 the NAACP brought 
lawsuits on a number of fronts, including school desegregation and 
restrictive covenants.28  By 1954, the NAACP achieved a major victory 
in Brown v. Board of Education29 when the Supreme Court declared 
that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30  While the ruling’s 
immediate impact was limited,31 Brown served to show others that 
litigation “protect[ed] the rights and enlarg[ed] the power of 
subordinated groups, particularly when other channels of influence 
[were] unavailable.”32  After the early success of Brown, other activists 
formed public interest organizations that achieved a number of 
successes of their own.33  Conservative advocates eventually followed 
this strategy, balancing what was initially seen as a liberal-dominated 
                                                          
 26. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 606 (attributing the broader public 
interest law movement of the 1960s to the work of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund). 
 27. Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1693, 1701 (2004) (noting that the litigation prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), was funded “by the NAACP’s members, by the plaintiffs and their 
communities, and to a minor extent by foundation grants”).  Certainly, some activist 
litigation efforts came earlier in the century.  See generally Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, 
and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 97–100 
(2002) (examining the role that the NAACP’s lawyers played in formulating 
litigation strategies to promote social change from 1910–1920); see also Albiston & 
Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 63–64 (describing the “Emergent Era” of 
public interest organizations before 1965, which included the founding of the ACLU 
and the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund). 
 28. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1698 (detailing how the organization brought 
suits on a number of issues across different geographic regions that often caused 
internal friction among its lawyers). 
 29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 30. Id. at 495. 
 31. See Martha Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 11, 14 (2004) (describing how the “all deliberate speed” language of Brown’s 
follow-up litigation allowed for southern states to resist implementation and ensure 
Brown’s requirements were never fully realized). 
 32. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 606. 
 33. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1695 (chronicling the “proliferation of planned 
litigation campaigns” after the Brown decision and its successes, including the 
NAACP’s effort to limit the death penalty, the ACLU’s work on prison conditions, 
and welfare rights groups’ campaigns to increase government assistance). 
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field.34  By the 1960s and into the 1970s, a broader public interest 
movement existed that continues to this day.35 
Civil rights advocates also played a role in the more defining trend 
of the 1960s:  major federal legislation bringing about a number of 
protections in civil rights.36  However, with the prospect of major 
federal action, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act37 and its 
prohibition on employment discrimination, activists were also forced 
to grapple with how such statutory rights should be enforced.38  In 
particular, policy debates over Title VII focused on whether the 
United States should create a government agency to bring forth 
lawsuits for violations of these newly conferred rights, or in the 
alternative, whether it should opt for a private right of action to be 
brought by individual litigants against those who violate the statutory 
proscriptions.39  Conceptually, a private right of action can, inter alia, 
incentivize attorneys and their clients to take legal action, thereby 
ensuring greater enforcement of the law than a centralized agency 
                                                          
 34. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of 
“Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2005) (drawing attention to the 
conservative advocates who organized public interest law firms to offer an intellectual 
counterweight to liberal organizations that were dominating the courts). 
 35. Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 64. 
 36. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1714 (arguing that Brown’s troubled legacy may 
lie not in its immediate effect on desegregation in public schools but how the case 
served as an “early—and limited—statement” of “the Great Society’s substantive 
liberalism,” that was eventually enacted in “[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and innumerable other statutes and administrative policies”).  But 
see Susan D. Carle, How Myth-Busting About the Historical Goals of Civil Rights Activism 
Can Illuminate Future Paths, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 167, 178–79 (2011) (arguing that 
the NAACP’s test case strategy in Brown and other litigation efforts was important to 
the civil rights movement but not the exclusive means by which major federal 
legislation was eventually achieved). 
 37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66. 
 38. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
637, 692 (2013) (describing how, in opposition to democrats and civil rights activists, 
congressional “[r]epublicans stripped the [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission] of the strong administrative powers initially proposed by advocates of 
the job discrimination title, and provided instead for private lawsuits with economic 
incentives for enforcement, including attorney fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs”). 
 39. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1148 (2012) (characterizing the private 
enforcement regime as a “conscious congressional choice,” to “put into place a 
number of . . . statutes creating private rights of action—to help effectuate [the 
law’s] substantive aims,” all the while “explicitly reject[ing] bureaucratic 
enforcement regimes for the implementation of those directives” (footnote omitted)). 
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with limited resources.40  Yet, at the same time, if those individual 
litigants or their representation lack proper resources, reliance on a 
private right of action can result in less, not more enforcement.41  To 
the civil rights activists and legal advocates of the 1960s, private 
enforcement of Title VII could have easily meant the latter, less 
onerous regime.42  Instead, Title VII embodied a hybrid solution, 
whereby a litigant first files at the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, allowing the agency an opportunity to facilitate a 
settlement or pursue a civil action, while still preserving an 
employee’s right to eventually bring his case to federal court.43 
Over the next coming decades, the United States enacted a 
number of statutes that effectively embraced private enforcement of 
the law.  In particular, the once skeptical civil rights activists quickly 
realized that a private right of action, when paired with an attorney’s 
fee provision, can in fact go a long ways towards properly 
incentivizing lawyers to bring enforcement efforts on behalf of their 
clients.44  Based partly on this success, Congress implemented this 
basic model of regulatory enforcement in various other areas of the 
law in the post-Civil Rights Era,45 while also further incentivizing 
enforcement action through provisions that allowed for higher 
                                                          
 40. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 662–63 (reviewing literature on the 
public policy advantages of private enforcement of the law, which include, inter alia, 
expansion in resources, increased detection, less bureaucratic involvement, and 
reinforced notions of “participatory and democratic governance”). 
 41. See id. at 661–62 (noting that an agency with “strong formal powers, ample 
resources, and leadership dedicated to vigorous enforcement” can provide distinct 
advantages over a private enforcement regime that is not properly incentivized). 
 42. See id. at 692 (describing how, in the employment discrimination provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act, activists and proponents were “initially . . . sanguine about 
agency implementation and dubious about the effectiveness of private enforcement 
of Title VII, even with attorney fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs”); see also Glover, 
supra note 39, at 1149 (noting that civil rights advocates wanted the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission to have cease-and-desist powers rather than 
rely on private litigants for enforcement). 
 43. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 688–91 (providing an overview of the 
Civil Right Act’s Title VII statutory framework). 
 44. See id. at 693 (noting that civil rights advocates “observed levels of private 
enforcement that far exceeded their expectations” because, in part, the Civil Right 
Act’s attorney’s fee provision provided a necessary source of financial support that 
enabled public interest organizations to litigate cases and laid the groundwork for a 
“private, for-profit bar” that also brought enforcement actions). 
 45. See id. (asserting that public interest organizations throughout the 1970s 
organized to expand Title VII’s enforcement model “beyond civil rights to embrace 
environmental, consumer protection, and ‘public interest’ regulation in general”). 
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damage awards.46  Today, the United States’ use of the private right of 
action continues unabated, with a number of federal statutes 
incentivizing individual litigants to sue with the promise of attorneys’ 
fees or high damage awards if successful.  In fact, over 150 statutes 
provide for fees to be shifted to encourage litigants to file suit, with 
over 90% of actions under these statutes brought by private parties.47 
B. Impact Litigation and the Backlash Against Public Interest Organizations 
Integral to (and perhaps overlooked by) this private enforcement 
scheme were public interest organizations that offered the resources 
and representation necessary for individual litigants to bring suit.  For 
a short while, the private enforcement regime embraced in the 1960s 
played out as it was expected to:  public interest organizations 
represented those clients who could not afford to pay for a lawyer, 
and were an “institutionalized” part of the legal system.48  By 1975, in 
what may have been a watershed moment for the public interest field, 
Justice Marshall stated that public interest lawyers “built on the 
[earlier] success[] of civil rights[,] . . . civil liberties,” to represent not 
only “a broad range of relatively powerless minorities,” but also the 
“neglected . . . interests that most of us share as consumers and as 
individuals in need of privacy and a healthy environment.”49  In short, 
public interest organizations became a crucial part of the private 
enforcement regime. 
Yet, despite his approval of the growing public interest movement, 
Justice Marshall also had the forbearance to point out that the field 
faced an uncertain future so long as one obstacle remained readily 
apparent:  funding.50  This prediction was accurate; as public interest 
                                                          
 46. See Glover, supra note 39, at 1151 (noting that a number of current statutes 
pair a private right of action with other incentivizing devices, such as “damage 
multipliers, statutory damages, [or] punitive damages”). 
 47. Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil 
Rights:  The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1087, 1089–90 (2007) [hereinafter Albiston & Nielsen, Procedural Attack].  One 
particularly important example is the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act, in which Congress provided a private right of action for victims to bring a civil 
action in federal district court against the perpetrators of human trafficking to 
recover damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2012). 
 48. See Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 66 (observing that 
many new public interest organizations emerged during an “expansion” era in public 
interest law from 1965 to 1980 as Congress increasingly embraced private 
enforcement of the law). 
 49. Thurgood Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice:  The Role of the 
Organized Bar, 61 A.B.A. J. 1487, 1487–88 (1975). 
 50. Id. at 1489. 
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law became increasingly more political, its funding sources became a 
target.51  Federal courts across the country cut back on doctrines once 
utilized by these organizations to bring suit.52  Congress enacted more 
restrictions on what type of litigants could be represented by Legal 
Service Corporations.53  Law school clinics were also criticized for 
bringing what some saw as overly controversial cases.54  Other legal 
doctrines made it more difficult for organizations to challenge 
agency action.55  Each trend ultimately strained the budgets of public 
interest organizations, and by 2009, a survey of public interest 
organizations found that “[v]irtually all organizations report[ed] 
major difficulties in meeting their financial needs.”56 
These funding problems only further influenced the type of work 
pursued by public interest organizations.  For example, Title VII 
employment discrimination claims—once a model for private 
enforcement of the law57—are now dramatically under-enforced 
because of the prohibitive expense of bringing such cases to trial.58  
                                                          
 51. See Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 66 (discussing the 
“embattled” era of public interest law throughout the 1980s and 1990s, whereby 
business organizations became hostile to the environmental and consumer rights 
lawsuits brought by public interest organizations and the Reagan Administration 
demonstrated “open hostility” to public interest organizations). 
 52. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 607 (contending that throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, “[a]n increasingly conservative federal judiciary became less 
hospitable to the claims of liberal public interest groups”). 
 53. See Luban, supra note 1, at 220–22 (detailing Congress’s enactments that 
restricted legal-services lawyers and Legal Service Corporation recipients from 
litigating certain cases and foreclosed representation of various types of clients). The 
Legal Service Corporation is “an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation that 
promotes equal access to justice and provides grants for high-quality civil legal 
assistance to low-income Americans.”  About LSC, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., 
http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc#sthash.zXI39MGk.dpuf (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 54. See Luban, supra note 1, at 236–40 (opining on the “notorious effort” by 
business organizations to prevent student-lawyers from bringing high-profile lawsuits 
after the Tulane Law School’s environmental law clinic prevented a factory from 
being built in a predominantly African American, low-income neighborhood). 
 55. See Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business As Usual?  Analyzing 
the Development of Environmental Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
289, 296 (2011) (analyzing the effect of the Supreme Court’s standing decisions on 
cases brought by environmentalists and organized businesses). 
 56. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 649. 
 57. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 693 (describing how civil rights activists 
embraced the early private enforcement of Title VII in the 1970s). 
 58. See Stephen Churchill, Making Employment Civil Rights Real, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. AMICUS, Oct. 2009, at 1, 5–6, available at http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/Churchill-FINAL.pdf (finding that the lack of 
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Individual plaintiffs simply cannot afford to pay an attorney with their 
own resources, so they often turn to public interest organizations.59  
However, these organizations cannot afford to take on every case and 
instead focus their efforts on bringing impact litigation,60 class action 
or individual lawsuits aiming to achieve “systemic relief.”61  
Importantly, impact litigation itself can be an extremely expensive 
undertaking and involves arranging funding from a number of 
different donors.62  Thus, while public interest organizations often 
pursue impact litigation to enforce private rights of action and 
other substantive legal rights, the costs involved in these cases only 
further limit their ability to properly enforce the law and ensure 
broader reform. 
Public interest organizations’ greater use of impact litigation is also 
increasingly criticized in academia and the press.  Commentators 
doubt litigation’s ability to reform societal and systemic problems.63  
Former Chief Judge Patricia Wald, for instance, noted that public 
interest organizations inevitably face tough choices because of their 
financing troubles, not all of which have to do with the underlying 
                                                          
enforcement of employment discrimination laws is due to the cost of hiring a private 
attorney for litigation and the unavailability of contingency fee arrangement). 
 59. See Christine Jolls, The Role and Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations 
in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 145–46 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005) 
(explaining that the ordinary approach of hiring a private lawyer is an incomplete 
strategy for enforcing employment laws in the United States). 
 60. See Churchill, supra note 58, at 6 (explaining public interest organizations’ 
“widely-held view” that financial constraints require that “impact litigation” be 
pursued over individual cases); see also Jolls, supra note 59, at 163 (discussing that 
public interest organizations “typically focus their energies on a small number of 
impact-type cases, often at the appellate level of the judicial system”). 
 61. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly:  Between “The 
Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 n.268 (2001) (defining 
impact litigation).  It is important to note that the term “impact litigation” is often 
viewed as distinct from “service work” which “refers to the individual and perhaps 
more routine case” brought by direct legal service providers.  Id.  While this 
Comment focuses on impact litigation, opening up funding for litigation would also 
conceivably allow for more routine service work by these organizations. 
 62. See, e.g., infra notes 97–104 and accompanying text (discussing the funding 
arrangements and cost involved in bringing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, an impact 
litigation case, to trial). 
 63. See generally Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 607–08 (reviewing the 
criticisms of public interest litigation that contend courts lack the power to enforce 
wide scale reform and litigation detracts from the political process that can bring 
broader reform). 
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merits of the case.64  Others raise concerns—many present since the 
Brown litigation65—that the interests of the public interest lawyer may 
not always align with the complicated objectives of the client.66  Not 
all academics agree with that premise, however, arguing that lawyers 
have a defensible role in serving broader interests at stake in the legal 
process.67  In response to this debate, public interest organizations 
broadened the scope of their efforts to include grassroots organizing 
and legislative lobbying.68  Nevertheless, litigation remains vital to the 
goals of public interest organizations today69—in fact, one recent 
survey found that “[n]inety percent of surveyed organizations bring 
impact cases, and nearly half of organizations . . . devote at least 50% 
of their efforts to such work.”70 
In short, public interest organizations and their litigation efforts 
cannot be divorced from the larger private enforcement regime in 
the United States.  Yet, it should be equally clear from their recent 
                                                          
 64. See Patricia M. Wald, Whose Public Interest Is It Anyway?:  Advice for Altruistic 
Young Lawyers, 47 ME. L. REV. 3, 10 (1995) (arguing a public interest practice involves 
“[j]udgment-calls on litigation made under financial constraints often involve the 
least elevated of concerns:  what one’s staff can do best, which judge will rule on the 
case, or how much publicity the case will generate for the project”). 
 65. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client Interests 
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (discussing the 
accountability issues in the context of the NAACP’s desegregation campaign and how 
the organization’s goals differed from the plaintiff-clients); see also Tushnet, supra 
note 27, at 1697–98 (criticizing the NAACP’s planned litigation campaign as “flawed 
from the outset” because “plaintiffs lose control of their cases as soon as they are filed”). 
 66. See Michael Grinthal, Power with:  Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 31 (2011) (arguing that the public interest lawyers’ 
strategies in class action and impact litigation “have been criticized both for failing to 
hold . . . lawyers accountable to the[ir] concerned constituencies, and for leaving 
those constituencies as marginalized as they were prior to the litigation, though 
perhaps materially better off”). 
 67. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7, at 678–79 (noting 
that “our legal system has long accepted . . . the concept of the plaintiff’s attorney as 
an entrepreneur who performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable 
conduct . . . . [A]lthough our law publicly expresses homage to individual clients, it 
privately recognizes their limited relevance in this context”). 
 68. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 611, 616 (contending that public 
interest organizations now realize that litigation must be used “in tandem” with other 
strategies to encourage support for their cause, as demonstrated by the gay rights 
movement’s recent “legal and non-legal advocacy”). 
 69. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2048 (finding that over the last three decades the 
percentage of legal work pursued by public interest organizations, including direct 
services to litigants, fell only from 60% to 51%, as legislative work, research, 
education, and media increased). 
 70. Id. 
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history that the availability of funding for their operations directly 
influences their ability to properly serve this important role in our 
legal system. 
C. Making Matters Worse:  The Supreme Court’s Limiting of Attorneys’ 
Fees in Buckhannon 
Despite the crucial role that already underfunded public interest 
organizations play in providing legal representation to litigants in the 
United States’ regime of private enforcement, the Supreme Court 
limited the availability of attorneys’ fees for these organizations in 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of 
Health and Human Services.71  In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court 
addressed the “fee shifting” provisions of two statutes—the Fair 
Housing Act72 and the Americans With Disabilities Act73—that 
allowed for a “prevailing party” in litigation to collect attorneys’ 
fees.74  Until the Court’s decision, courts often ruled that the 
“prevailing party” language included not only those litigants who 
obtained a judgment or consent decree from the court, but also those 
litigants who were able to “achieve[] the desired result because the 
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s 
conduct.”75  In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court dismissed this 
“catalyst theory,” holding that such a ruling “allows an award where 
there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of 
the parties.”76  The Supreme Court also ruled out concerns that 
rejecting the “catalyst theory” would push defendants to “unilaterally 
moot[] an action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award of 
attorneys’ fees,” or “deter plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive 
cases from bringing suit.”77  The Court determined such arguments 
to be “speculative and unsupported by any empirical evidence.”78 
The Buckhannon case directly impacted public interest 
organizations that were already financially constrained.  Fee-shifting 
provisions incentivize litigants to take advantage of the private rights 
                                                          
 71. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 72. Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968). 
 73. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990). 
 74. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 532 U.S. at 601.  These “fee shifting statutes” 
are exceptions to the “American Rule,” which asserts that litigants should pay their 
own legal expenses absent explicit language in the statute.  Id. at 602. 
 75. Id. at 601–02 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 605. 
 77. Id. at 608. 
 78. Id. 
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of action found so prominently throughout the United States’ 
statutory law.79  Indeed, the provision of attorneys’ fees was one of the 
prime reasons civil rights activists in the 1960s went along with a 
private enforcement regime in the first place.80  But after Buckhannon 
limited the ability to collect attorneys’ fees under these statutes, 
public interest lawyers could not earn back the considerable expenses 
they accrued in litigating many of these cases.81  This, in turn, 
deterred parties from reaching settlements82 and had an overall 
“chilling effect” on public interest litigation.83 
II. TWO POSSIBLE MODELS FOR FUNDING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
Faced with such internal resource constraints, a public interest 
organization may choose to pursue impact litigation or otherwise 
support a litigant exercising a private right of action by securing some 
form of funding from a third party.  Currently, public interest 
organizations rely on donations or foundational grants for most of 
                                                          
 79. See Albiston & Nielsen, Procedural Attack, supra note 47, at 1089–90 
(arguing that fee-shifting statutes encourage litigants to bring cases that vindicate 
“the broader public interest”). 
 80. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 693 (explaining that activists eventually 
embraced private enforcement of the law because it was properly incentivized and 
encouraged the private bar and public interest organizations to bring suit). 
 81. See Luban, supra note 1, at 244–45. Professor Luban provides a particularly 
interesting correspondence with a public interest lawyer to illustrate the effect of 
Buckhannon on public interest litigation: 
Buckhannon’s significance can’t be overstated.  True example:  We’ve 
been litigating fiercely a longstanding dispute with an agency.  We have 
just received a letter—after years of litigation mind you—saying, in 
essence, “you’re right, we’re wrong, we will change our policy to address 
your concerns.”  No judicial order will or now can be entered because 
the case will be moot. . . . I have no hope of getting fees here post-
Buckhannon, though we have, even using [the statute’s] low rates, 
probably $40,000 in fees in the case.  That is a big chunk of my budget.  
We see this kind of pattern:  lengthy litigation, and at some point, 
capitulation, time and again.  Up until now, using a catalyst theory, we 
could often get fees in these cases . . . .  Now we have no chance.  I can’t 
tell you how dispiriting this is for us. 
Id. (quoting David Vladeck, Public Citizen Litigation Group). 
 82. Albiston & Nielsen, Procedural Attack, supra note 47, at 1121. 
 83. See id. at 1120–21 (describing the results of their empirical study indicating 
that the most impacted by Buckhannon were those organizations that “engage in 
impact litigation, litigate against government actors, bring class actions, [or] work in 
the environmental, civil rights, or poverty areas”). 
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their financial support (“the Non-Profit Donor Model”).84  Much less 
frequent is the scenario where a public interest organization turns to 
a specialized, for-profit litigation financing firm (“the For-Profit 
Model”). These two models of funding public interest litigation, and 
the respective limits of each as a financing solution, are explored below. 
A. The Non-Profit Donor Model 
The non-profit donor model of funding public interest litigation is 
the norm for most organizations today.85  Under this arrangement, 
public interest organizations form as non-profit organizations with 
tax-exempt status.86  By no means does this status prevent the 
organization from charging attorneys’ fees for their work87—in fact, a 
number of legal aid services are now experimenting with charging 
below-market rates for their services.88  The problem, however, is that 
most of the public interest organization’s clients simply cannot pay 
                                                          
 84. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the non-
profit donor model, whereby foundations provide grants to public interest organizations 
that then rely predominantly on those funds to carry out their legal activities). 
 85. While not the focus of this Comment, some public interest organizations also 
organize as for-profit “public interest law firms,” but these organizations also 
experience budgetary issues as well.  See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 624–
25 (noting that public interest law firms often have limited staff, operate under 
financial constraints, and face well-funded opposition that force them to pursue only 
cases that award high fees).  Nevertheless, public interest law firms do litigate in the 
public interest by taking on cases that generate larger damage awards that can then 
be put towards less profitable but more cause-oriented cases.  See Scott L. Cummings, 
Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6 (2012) (providing a case 
study of a public interest law firm that funds “higher yield ‘bread and butter cases,’” 
such as employment discrimination cases, in order to subsidize a higher risk, but 
more cause-orientated case in the human rights field). 
 86. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 74 
(discussing the “institutionalized model” of public interest law whereby most 
organize as nonprofit 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations). 
 87. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, §§ 4.02, 5.01–5.02 (stating that a public 
interest organization “may accept attorneys’ fees in public interest cases if such fees 
are paid directly by its clients,” provided that such fees do “not exceed the actual cost 
incurred in each case” and the organization does not “withdraw from the case 
because the litigant is unable to pay the contemplated fee”).  These IRS revenue 
procedures are “guidelines” issued by the agency to ensure that public interest 
organizations maintain a “charitable character” and therefore properly receive tax-
exempt status.  See id.  § 1. 
 88. See, e.g., Michael Zuckerman, The Utah Lawyers Who Are Making Legal Services 
Affordable, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2014, 12:02 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2014/08/the-utah-lawyers-who-are-making-legal-services-affordable/ 
375717 (discussing a public interest organization that does not provide its services for 
free but instead chooses to charge clients on a “sliding scale” based on their incomes). 
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for legal services,89 let alone afford the costs associated with a 
protracted and resource-intensive impact litigation effort.  
Furthermore, even if the public interest organization does receive 
attorneys’ fees from a client, it must not jeopardize its tax-exempt 
status by running afoul of IRS rules governing such compensation.90 
Instead, public interest organizations often pursue funding from 
philanthropic or government sources.  Some organizations collect 
membership dues, receive government funding, or raise donations 
from private individuals.91  Others may turn to a fellow non-profit to 
provide additional funds to the public interest organization.92  More 
often than not, the public interest organization will rely heavily on 
the financial support of foundations.93  In most instances, this 
foundational support will come in the form of a grant that helps 
cover the costs of litigation, attorneys’ fees, and the organization’s 
broader advocacy efforts.94  In this arrangement, the foundation 
makes payments directly to the public interest organization, which 
agrees to abide by the terms of the grant in exchange for the funds.95 
                                                          
 89. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that 45 million low-income 
Americans are eligible for legal aid). 
 90. See generally Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 4.01–.05 (establishing 
guidelines for public interest organizations that engage in litigation and accept 
attorneys’ fees from either a client or defendant, including requirements that the 
organization report all recovered fees, limit the amount of fees accepted, and 
decline such fees if the “organization believes the litigants have a sufficient 
commercial or financial interest in the outcome of the litigation to justify retention 
of a private law firm”). 
 91. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 76 
(providing survey results indicating that private contributions account for about 
fifteen percent of public interest organizations’ budgets, with membership dues, 
fundraising, and attorneys’ fees each roughly constituting only a surprising five 
percent share of their overall funding). 
 92. See, e.g., About Us, IMPACT FUND, http://impactfund.org/?page_id=534 (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2014) (noting the non-profit’s “Grant Making Program awards 
funding to public interest lawyers to advance costs in systemic impact litigation”). 
 93. See Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 75–76 (finding that 
foundations provide the greatest amount of support to public interest organizations 
while federal and state funding is becoming increasingly important).  
 94. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 628 (providing the results of a 
recent survey indicating that a growing portion of a public interest organization’s 
legal work is funded through grants from foundations). 
 95. See, e.g., Types of Grants, FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/ 
grants/types-of-grants (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (defining a grant as a “commitment 
by the foundation to make payments to an organization,” that ensures “grantee 
autonomy over management of the funds” but also requires the grantee to agree to 
terms and conditions that further the foundation’s purpose).  For example, in 2014, 
the Ford Foundation provided $1.3 million in a grant to the NAACP Legal Defense 
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Interestingly, a public interest organization may also pursue a 
foundation’s support by obtaining a program-related investment96 
(“PRI”) in its litigation effort.  A recent impact litigation effort 
illustrates how this may work.  In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,97 three 
workers, representing a class of 1.5 million Wal-Mart employees, 
brought a discrimination lawsuit against the retailer under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as 
well as damages for back pay.98  The plaintiffs were represented by 
two public interest organizations—the Impact Fund and Equal Rights 
Advocates (“ERA”)—as well as several private law firms.99  Despite this 
coordinated effort, the Impact Fund and ERA faced considerable 
costs in litigating the case.100  The Rosenberg Foundation, a non-
profit that provides grants to public interest organizations, stepped in 
and provided $500,000 in “ongoing support to ERA to continue its 
role as lawyer and public interest voice in the case.”101  Notably, the 
foundation did not merely donate the money in the form of a grant; 
it also provided a PRI by agreeing to guarantee a loan that the Sisters 
of Mercy of the Americas, a “socially responsible invest[or],” made to 
the Impact Fund.102  Under this arrangement, if the plaintiffs were 
successful, the loan would be repaid.103  On the other hand, if the 
plaintiffs lost the case, the Rosenberg Foundation would cover the 
cost of the loan.104  In this fashion, the Rosenberg Foundation and 
Sister of Mercy of the Americas orchestrated an investment—rather 
                                                          
and Education Fund for “[a]dvocacy, [l]itigation and [r]eform” See NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/ 
grants/grantdetails?grantid=121111 (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 96. Program-related investments (“PRI”) are defined as “investments made by 
foundations to support charitable activities that involve the potential return of capital 
within an established time frame.  PRIs include financing methods commonly 
associated with banks or other private investors, such as loans, loan guarantees, 
linked deposits, and even equity investments in charitable organizations or in 
commercial ventures for charitable purposes.”  Knowledge Base, GRANTSPACE, 
http://www.grantspace.org/Tools/Knowledge-Base/Funding-Research/Definitions-
and-Clarification/PRIs (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).  
 97. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 98. Id. at 2547.  
 99. See id. at 2546 (providing list of counsel).  
 100. See The Rosenberg Foundation:  Supporting a Class Action Against Wal-Mart, 
ALLIANCE MAG., Dec. 2008, at 48, 48 (promoting the public interest 
organization’s role in the Dukes litigation and detailing the Rosenberg 
Foundation’s investment in the case).  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
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than merely a grant—that hinged on the success of an impact 
litigation effort. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs in Dukes 
by decertifying the class.105  Nevertheless, as detailed in an Alliance 
Magazine article, this novel funding arrangement enabled the Impact 
Fund to cover the “significant costs of bringing [the] landmark case 
to trial.”106  Moreover, Wal-Mart felt pressured enough by the 
litigation to make changes to their corporate policy by raising pay for 
female workers and providing healthcare benefits.107  Thus, while the 
ruling itself is controversial, the financial arrangement behind the 
litigation reveals the potential for a socially-motivated entity to 
finance an ongoing impact litigation effort to achieve social goals. 
PRIs, however, are anything but common in the traditional non-
profit donor model of funding public interest litigation.  This, in 
many ways, is due to an uncertain regulatory apparatus.  Under 
current tax law, a foundation like the Rosenberg Foundation must 
spend 5% of its funds to maintain its tax-exempt status and avoid 
scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service.108  To fulfill this 
obligation, a foundation is left with two options—either it can 
provide a traditional grant in furtherance of its charitable endeavor, 
essentially giving the money away with no monetary return, or it can 
make an investment in “for-profit ventures with the potential for a 
return on [its] money and recirculating it for [its own] charitable 
purposes.”109  However, in an effort to keep foundations from taking 
on too much risk, the foundation faces a 10% excise tax if it makes 
any investment that “jeopardize[s] the carrying out of any of its 
exempt [purposes].”110  PRIs, however, work as an exception to that 
                                                          
 105. Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552, 2561 (2011). 
 106. See The Rosenberg Found., supra note 100, at 48. 
 107. Id. (touting the litigation’s impact prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling by 
noting that Wal-Mart reworked its pay system, increased health benefits, raised 
compensation for female employees by  $400 million per year, and adopted a new 
job posting process, all of which encouraged other competitors to alter their policies). 
 108. See 26 U.S.C. § 4942(e)(1) (2012); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. 
Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 396 (2014) (discussing how 
private foundations fulfill distribution obligations under § 4942 through PRIs in 
nonprofit and for-profit entities).  
 109. Tara Fitzgerald Urich, Business Organizations in the 21st Century:  A Look at New 
Legal Forms for Business that Enhance Social Enterprise, 23 S. L.J. 329, 332.  For a more in 
depth review of the IRS’s recent guidance on program related investments in the 
context of a social enterprise, see Esposito, supra note 16, at 683.  
 110. 26 U.S.C. § 4944(a)(1); see Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs 
for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (a/k/a “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 
711 (2012) (noting that these investment provisions were included in the “Tax 
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rule, allowing a foundation to make an investment so long as it is in 
line with the foundation’s charitable purpose.111  Such PRIs have 
unique advantages over grants in that they make a monetary return, 
but unfortunately it is not clear what actually qualifies as a PRI.112  
Furthermore, if a foundation makes a PRI later found to be outside 
of the foundation’s purpose, then that foundation may face a 
number of harsh consequences.113  Given this uncertainty, it is not 
surprising that what the Rosenberg Foundation did in Dukes was the 
first PRI in the Foundation’s history.114 
Broadly speaking, the non-profit donor model is further limited in 
its ability to provide adequate funding for public interest 
organizations in a number of other ways.  First, because a public 
interest organization often organizes as a non-profit organization, it 
cannot make distributions to its shareholders.115  This, in turn, limits 
the capital available to public interest organizations to those that 
want to donate funds and excludes any investors in the equity of the 
                                                          
Reform Act of 1969 to curb abusive or extremely risky investment-related activities 
undertaken by private foundations”). 
 111. See 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (stating that “investments, the primary purpose of 
which is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), 
and no significant purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation 
of property, shall not be considered as investments which jeopardize the carrying out 
of exempt purposes”).  Specifically, § 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code 
sets out that a foundation must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition  . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals.” Id. § 170(c)(2)(B). 
 112. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 683–84 (discussing the vagueness in the 
Internal Revenue Service’s guidance on program-related investments).  
 113. See Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for Program-Related 
Investments, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 11, 12–13 (noting that if a foundation 
makes a PRI that does not satisfy the IRS requirements, then a possible excise tax 
may be imposed or the foundation’s tax-exempt status may be revoked). 
 114. Rosenberg Found., supra note 100, at 48.  
 115. See Brewer, supra note 110, at 695. Importantly, Professor Brewer points out 
just how limited the distribution requirements are on non-profits: 
[N]onprofit status does not permit any type of equity participation in the 
growth and enterprise value of the organization. Reasonable 
compensation and bonuses may be paid to employees, but nonprofits 
have no owners and hence all net earnings remain inside the nonprofit 
for use in fulfilling the mission of the organization. Upon liquidation of 
a nonprofit, the net proceeds must be distributed to another nonprofit 
or to the government. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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organization.116  Second, while the public interest organization may 
turn to the private bar to fill any gap in funding, reliance on pro 
bono commitments raises issues of its own.117  Third, when a public 
interest organization exhausts its own resources and turns to a 
foundation in hopes of securing a grant or PRI, it will likely not find a 
participant as willing as the Rosenberg Foundation was in Dukes.118  
Rather, foundations typically prefer alternative ventures to make their 
impact and may lack the enthusiasm for protracted and lengthy 
impact litigation.119  When foundations do support a public interest 
organization in an impact litigation case, they often lack the legal 
expertise to properly target their efforts.120  Furthermore, 
foundations may be hesitant to make use of PRIs because of the 
considerable tax-planning costs and uncertainty surrounding such 
investments.121  In short, the non-profit donor model of funding 
public interest litigation offers a limited pool of capital, lacks the 
expertise and focus of a dedicated financing operation, and works 
under an extensive yet uncertain regulatory regime. 
                                                          
 116. See id.; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining that public 
interest organizations rely in large part on philanthropic support from foundations 
to supplement a large portion of their budgets). 
 117. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 622–23 (describing how public 
interest organizations increasingly rely on the pro bono work of large law firms, but 
that these same firms often lack the will to bring cases against corporations, as well as 
the resources and expertise to pursue a litigation effort as a piece of a larger 
campaign effort for social change).  
 118. See, e.g., Aaron Glantz, Foundations Weighing Their Options After Wal-Mart Suit, 
BAY CITIZEN (June 20, 2011, 8:19 PM), https://www.baycitizen.org/news/law/ 
foundations-pull-plug-wal-mart-suit (reporting that many of the foundations and 
donors supporting the case pulled funding after the plaintiffs lost the 
certification battle at the Supreme Court, leaving the litigants with the money 
already donated by Rosenberg).   
 119. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2056 (conveying survey responses that indicate 
public interest organizations have “particular problems with foundations,” 
many of which do not fund litigation efforts, lack expertise in public interest 
litigation, or otherwise appear more interested in supporting those issues with 
“measurable outcomes”).  
 120. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 628 (characterizing foundations 
and philanthropic donors as “strikingly unstrategic” in their donations, as “[m]any 
operate with a ‘spray and pray’ approach, which spreads assistance on multiple 
projects with the hope that something good will come of it”). 
 121. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 684 (noting that the confusion on how PRIs are 
taxed have led to a reluctance on the part of foundations to utilize the arrangement). 
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B. The For-Profit Litigation Finance Model 
While certainly not the norm, a public interest organization could 
resort to funding from a for-profit litigation financing firm.  
Litigation financing122 is the practice by which “a third party (other 
than the lawyer in the case) [gains] a financial stake in the outcome 
of [a] case in exchange for money paid to a party in the case.”123  This 
form of financing has become increasingly popular in litigation 
today.124  While small funders have provided modest financing in 
personal injury cases for a number of years,125 the practice is broadly 
defined to encompass a more recent (and controversial) trend, by 
which well-capitalized institutional players provide a variety of 
different financing arrangements to litigants and businesses.126  It is 
this part of the litigation finance industry that has garnered particular 
attention as of late,127 as specialized litigation financing firms enter 
into the market to provide financing in major commercial lawsuits, 
including, among others, antitrust and intellectual property 
disputes.128  This new industry promises to grow in the foreseeable 
                                                          
 122. Alternative names for litigation finance include:  “third-party litigation 
financing,” “alternative litigation financing,” or “litigation funding” with various 
acronyms for each.  This article will refer to “litigation finance” and “litigation 
financing firms” to describe the recent move towards institutions that are exclusively 
devoted to funding litigation.  
 123. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES 5 (2012) [hereinafter COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT]. 
 124. Id. at 1. 
 125. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND. CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS, 8–9 (2010) (reviewing the different 
segments of the litigation finance industry and separating funders who provide small 
amounts of funds to plaintiffs in personal tort injury lawsuits from larger funders that 
finance commercial litigation cases). 
 126. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 8 
(describing a “very different segment of the [litigation-financing] market involv[ing] 
public and private funds that seek to invest in large, complex commercial lawsuits, 
including contract, intellectual property, and antitrust litigation”); see also How We Help, 
BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/how-we-help/#sthash.ZcfoaD8U.dpuf 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (stating that Burford provides “straightforward funding of 
the legal fees and expenses for a case (or a portfolio of cases) to a wide and varied 
suite of corporate finance solutions for businesses and law firms”).  
 127. See, e.g., Investing in Someone Else’s Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-
lawsuit (exploring the various issues involved in specialized litigation financing and 
providing a number of differing viewpoints on the practice).  
 128. See, e.g., How It Works, JUR. ASSET MGMT., http://juridicamanagement.com/ 
litigation-finance/how-it-works.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (stating that Juridica 
provides funding to “corporate claimants” but does not fund personal injury, 
product liability, mass tort, or class actions); see also COMM’N ON ETHICS, 
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future—one of these specialized firms, Gerchen Keller Capital, 
amassed $260 million for the sole purpose of investing in complex 
litigation in early 2014,129 while another firm, Burford Capital 
(“Burford”), achieved a 46% return on its litigation investments 
across its entire portfolio.130 
A litigation financing firm operates by raising capital and then 
selecting cases that will likely be profitable.  The firm incorporates as 
a for-profit company that specializes strictly in funding litigation 
efforts.131  Unlike a traditional law firm, this entity is not governed by 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,132 which allows it to have a 
board of directors and raise capital from a number of non-lawyer 
shareholders and outside investors.133  Many of these investors are 
high net worth individuals or traditional investors such as investment 
funds.134  Some firms are even publicly traded.135  Once capitalized, 
                                                          
INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 8 (noting that firms finance antitrust 
lawsuits and intellectual property cases).  
 129. William Alden, Litigation Finance Firm Raises $260 Million for New Fund, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2014, 10:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/litigation-
finance-firm-raises-260-million-for-new-fund/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 130. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 180 
(2014) (noting, however, that this high return rate is “net of losses, but . . . took time 
to generate and do[es] not reflect uncommitted capital still in reserve”). 
 131. See, e.g., Who We Are, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/who-we-
are (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (describing the company as “the world’s largest 
provider of investment capital and risk solutions for litigation”). 
 132. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?  Third-Party Litigation Funding, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1294 (2011) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim] (stating that 
“finance firms are not subject to the constraints imposed by the canons of 
professional responsibility”).  Nevertheless, practicing attorneys who represent clients 
funded by litigation financing firms are governed by ethical rules.  See COMM’N ON 
ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 39 (concluding that “[l]awyers 
must adhere to principles of professional independence, candor, competence, 
undivided loyalty, and confidentiality when representing clients in connection with 
[litigation finance] transactions”). 
 133. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1294 (contrasting litigation 
financing firms from law firms because litigation financing firms “can take on 
matters that conflict, can solicit clients, and have nonlawyers in management 
positions,” as well as access financing from outside investors, join in the “ventures of 
their clients,” and receive “alternative forms of compensation such as equity in 
intellectual property or exploration and drilling rights”).  
 134. GARBER, supra note 125, at 8.  
 135. See Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit:  A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 130 
(2013) (explaining that Juridica Investments and Burford Capital, two firms 
publically traded on the London Stock Exchange, often invest in U.S. commercial 
litigation with approximately $200 million in managed assets); see also Molot, supra 
note 130, at 178 (explaining that Burford raised capital in London (but also invested 
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the litigation financing firm, often under the management of finance 
professionals and individuals with litigation experience,136 analyzes 
cases to determine whether the underlying claims of the prospect 
case have merit.137  If the plaintiff passes this initial due diligence 
process, “the financing company will advance amounts to cover 
attorneys’ fees and the other costs of litigation,” which “typically are 
made to the claimant or its outside litigation counsel, in return for a 
percentage of any eventual recovery.”138  In many respects then, a 
specialized litigation financing firm acts as a “middle man” that pools 
capital from a variety of investors and shareholders and then advances 
funds to plaintiffs in exchange for a share in the litigation proceeds.139 
Nevertheless, the details on the contracts between these various 
players are relatively scarce.140  To combat this uncertainty, Professor 
Steinitz launched an online project in an effort to create a model 
litigation finance arrangement.141  In particular, Professor Steinitz 
suggests that litigation financing firms organize like venture capital 
firms by, among other things, establishing limited partnership 
agreements with their investors.142  Under this arrangement, investors 
would be limited partners who earn a return once the case has 
                                                          
in United States litigation) because investors there “understood the [litigation 
finance] model and thought that it would work just as well in the United States as in the 
United Kingdom—indeed, potentially better given the sheer size of the U.S. market”). 
 136. See Molot, supra note 130, at 178 (detailing Burford Capital’s due diligence 
process whereby its legal team evaluates the underlying facts and merits of a case, 
applicable laws, possible forums, the lawyers hired (or “propose[d] to[ be] hire[d]”) 
by the client, and the parties’ monetary resources). 
 137. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 
2011-2 (2011) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2011-2]. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Alden, supra note 129 (discussing a litigation financing firm that 
originally invested in other companies who fund cases on behalf of investors but 
eventually “decided to ‘cut out the middleman’ and set up a firm to invest in the 
claims themselves”). 
 140. See GARBER, supra note 125, at 8 n.3 (explaining that a lack of public 
information on litigation financing firms and their contracts is due to an absence of 
any obligation to make their activities or contracts public). 
 141. See generally Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance 
Contract, http://litigationfinancecontract.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (providing 
various posts and discussions on the litigation finance contract and how the industry 
should organize itself).  The project is now complete, culminating in the release of 
Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
711 (2014) [hereinafter Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract]. 
 142. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 500–
01 (2012) [hereinafter Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract]. 
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generated an award.143  The litigation financing firm would then acts 
as the general partner, entering into contracts with claimholders on 
behalf of the limited partnership’s funds as “a money management 
company that employs professionals with specialized expertise.”144  
The litigation financing firm then makes money by earning a “small 
management fee” on the assembled pool of capital, and earns a 
larger share of any proceeds if the plaintiff’s litigation is successful.145  
This structure and method of compensation separates passive 
investors from the management of the litigation financing firm, 
allows for a fund to be established for a portfolio of cases, and 
ultimately “aligns the [litigation financing firm’s] interests with those 
of the investors.”146  As between the litigation financing firm and the 
plaintiff, another contractual relationship is established that consists 
of transferring a share of the proceeds of the case to the financing 
firm in exchange for the advance of funds.147 
As can be imagined, litigation finance garners considerable media 
attention and academic research.  Pointedly, a number of 
commentators have questioned whether litigation funding is really a 
“boon for access to justice,” or just disguising the “commodification 
of litigation.”148  The financing firms are particularly adamant about 
the former argument, asserting that if the practice is allowed to fully 
flourish in the United States, non-recourse lending will flow from 
investors to disadvantaged claimholders with meritorious cases and 
provide greater access to the judicial system.149  Some also argue that 
litigation financing has the potential to support the private 
enforcement legal regime, while leveling out the bargaining 
dynamics between individual plaintiffs and “repeat players” such as 
corporations.150  While all seemingly possible in the abstract, critics 
                                                          
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 496. 
 145. Id. at 500.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 503.  
 148. Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 95. 
 149. See, e.g., The Basics, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/litigation-
finance/the-basics (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (“Open access to civil justice is a 
fundamental characteristic of any meaningful legal system, but the onerous costs of 
pursuing cases can put the courts out of reach to many.  By making it economically 
feasible to bring worthy claims, litigation finance allows parties to pursue cases that 
might otherwise have proved too costly.”). 
 150. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1336 (describing how, in theory, 
litigation financing firms can provide the resources for litigants to bring suit, and 
“[i]n the process . . . promote not only private enforcement of environmental and 
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respond that the litigation-financing industry has simply not lived up 
to its promise:  instead of fostering access to the legal system, 
litigation financing has been criticized as favoring already favored 
commercial parties,151 and providing little assistance to 
disenfranchised groups for which access to justice is a very real 
problem.152  This reality is driven, in part, by two trends in the 
industry:  the exclusion of public interest litigation and an uncertain 
regulatory regime. 
1. The exclusion of public interest organizations:  An incentives problem 
Much of the litigation finance industry’s deficiencies in providing 
access to justice can be attributed to its exclusion of public interest 
organizations and their clients.  This is in many ways a problem of 
incentives.  First, litigation financing firms, as they currently operate, 
are concerned with profit.153  This is not surprising, because these 
specialized firms have investors and shareholders to whom they owe a 
duty to maximize profits154—the so-called “[s]hareholder 
                                                          
human rights standards, but also engage in rule change in areas where the funder 
may have a similar, or even greater, incentive than the plaintiffs to play for rules”). 
 151. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 
8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 593, 610 (2012) (arguing that litigation financing firms “have 
little incentive to finance cases where plaintiffs face significant barriers to justice” 
because “investors face the highest potential returns in the types of cases where the 
underlying substantive law creates risk and cost imbalances that already give plaintiffs 
the advantage”).  
 152. See Nicholas Dietsch, Note, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and 
Australia:  How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 710 
(2011) (finding that the growth of litigation finance has not resulted in increased 
access to justice for low-income plaintiffs as firms fund primarily commercial litigation 
or otherwise wait for courts to further clarify their position on the practice). 
 153. See GARBER, supra note 125, at 23–24.  In particular, Garber describes how the 
litigation financing firms, which he calls alternative litigation finance firms (“ALFs”), 
are primarily focused on earning a return for their own investors: 
ALF suppliers offer capital to ALF demanders in hopes of making 
money—business profits in the cases of ALF companies and investment 
income in the cases of other ALF suppliers.  And, it seems, ALF suppliers 
such as investment funds are willing to accept substantial risks associated 
with particular investments in exchange for opportunities to achieve 
unusually high rates of return on their capital.  ALF companies seek to 
profit in an environment in which they wish to please their investors. 
Id. 
 154. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 739 
(explaining that litigation financing firms have a duty to maximize profit for their 
investors but lack any fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs). 
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maximization norm” that pervades in other contexts.155  For this very 
reason, firms tend to go where the money lies—by funding commercial 
lawsuits with the largest potential for an award or large settlement.156  
Public interest organizations, on the other hand, are not 
predominantly concerned with profit;157 they often bring impact 
litigation with the precise goal of obtaining injunctive and equitable 
relief.158  They may also pursue cases against the government with the 
goal of obtaining a change in policy,159 or may even find value in a 
case that is eventually lost.160  Thus, litigation financing firms have 
little incentive to fund the cases public interest organizations bring, 
many of which lie in the controversial environmental, employment 
discrimination, and civil rights areas of law.161  It does, however, beg 
                                                          
 155. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 
216 (2013) (explaining the so-called “shareholder wealth maximization” norm that 
serves as “the positive foundation and normative goals of corporate law” which 
prioritizes “the interests of shareholders and discount[s] the interests of 
nonshareholder constituents of corporations including employees, creditors, 
suppliers, and customers”). 
 156. See supra notes 125, 152 and accompanying text (explaining that litigation 
financing firms fund cases in the commercial realm to the exclusion of poor and 
disadvantaged parties while small funders provide financing to individual litigants in 
tort law suits).  
 157. Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 62–63 (distinguishing 
public interest organizations from the “business-like model of modern private law 
offices” because their practice often includes clients who do not pay for their 
representation, involves cases that may often be inherently risky, and involves non-
traditional activities such as “community outreach and education, talking with the 
media, organizing coalitions, [and] participating in demonstrations”). 
 158. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance:  Taking Accountability Seriously, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 303–04 (2010) [hereinafter Coffee, Litigation Governance] 
(explaining that public interest organizations, such as the ACLU, Legal Defense 
Fund, and Sierra Club, often pursue injunctive or equitable relief but may also seek 
monetary damages when representing litigants in class action lawsuits).  
 159. See La Belle, supra note 8, at 43–44 (explaining that public interest 
organizations often represent litigants in public law adjudication). 
 160. See Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821 (2013) 
(arguing that losing a case can have more concrete benefits in drawing attention to 
social problems, the inadequacy of current solutions, and serve as a mobilizer for 
broader efforts); supra note 107 and accompanying text (touting the impact made by 
the public interest organization and foundation that funded the Dukes litigation 
despite losing the case at the Supreme Court).   
 161. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 739–40 
(explaining that the duty to maximize profit will push funders to pursue cases that 
emphasize “monetary remedies over non-monetary ones such as injunctive relief, 
declaratory relief, a public apology, a change of an internal policy, or a change in the 
law”); see also Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 158, at 342 (explaining that 
litigants in environmental law, employment discrimination, and civil rights class 
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the question whether the litigation finance industry can ever make 
good on its promise to provide access to justice and private 
enforcement of the law while it systematically excludes public interest 
organizations from its client base. 
Additionally, public interest organizations may avoid for-profit 
litigation financing because of concerns that the industry may 
compromise the public interest organization’s attorney-client 
relationships.  Quite often, litigation financing firms want to be able 
to select the plaintiff’s attorney in the cases in which they invest.162  
They also may want some say in whether to settle a case.163  By doing 
this, funders gain control over a lawsuit in order to “monetize” their 
investment for shareholders and investors.164  For a public interest 
organization that owes a duty to provide independent and objective 
counsel to its clients,165 however, this is particularly worrisome.  First, 
ceding representation of the case to another lawyer of the financing 
firm’s choosing may complicate the public interest organization’s 
strategy in what is usually a smaller piece in a larger coordinated 
effort of grassroots organizing and advocacy.166  Second, as discussed 
supra, the public interest organization’s clients will quite often make 
claims in areas of the law that “involve bundled interests, both 
monetary and nonmonetary, underlying large and complex legal 
                                                          
actions often seek injunctive and equitable relief but the litigation financing firm is 
only concerned with obtaining a monetary award). 
 162. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1323 n.195 (recognizing that 
funders and plaintiffs commonly debate who will select counsel). 
 163. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 484 (acknowledging 
concerns that litigation financing may limit a client’s control over a case, especially 
regarding decisions on whether to settle a case).   
 164. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1323 (“[F]inanced clients . . . will 
pay a price in the form of diminished control over their case—from choice of 
attorney to settlement.  The argument against litigation funding based on the client’s 
diminished control is, in essence, one of separation of ownership and control 
between the client and the funder.”  (footnote omitted)).  Some funders have 
explicitly claimed that their companies do not apply pressure to the plaintiff’s 
control of the case.  See Molot, supra note 130, at 178 (describing how Burford acts a 
“passive provider” in funding cases by not attempting to influence litigation strategy, 
settlement negotiation, or the attorney-client relationship).  But see Kalajdzic et al., 
supra note 135, at 137 (arguing that the potential still exists for firms to control 
litigation despite firms publically disclaiming any interest in doing so).   
 165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2014) (stating that a lawyer must 
exercise independent professional judgment when representing a client).  
 166. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that as a result of 
criticism on public interest litigation organizations have resituated their legal efforts 
in a broader campaign of advocacy and organizing). 
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claims.”167  Litigation financing firms, in comparison, only seek an 
eventual share in the monetary proceeds of a settlement and may 
therefore pressure public interest organizations to settle early for a 
monetary amount, while a public interest organization may want to 
pursue the case further to obtain the benefits of non-monetary relief 
for its client.168  In fact, the financing firm may be under pressure 
from its own investors and shareholders to settle the case and 
distribute a return.169  Conversely, a public interest organization or 
client that is more concerned with a large damage award is now freed 
from “the risk of a loss, [and] may now have an incentive to resist a 
reasonable and rational early settlement in favor of a late settlement 
or even a risky and expensive trial.”170  Either way, the litigation 
financing firm, motivated by maximizing profits, may pull on the 
loyalty owed by the public interest lawyer to his client, and push him 
or her to pursue strategies that are not in line with the best interests 
or objectives of the client.171  Indeed, litigation financing firms have 
hesitated to take an interest in funding class actions, where public 
interest organizations stand to earn larger damage awards, until these 
ethical concerns facing the industry are resolved.172  In short, so long 
as the interests between the litigation financing firm remain at odds 
with the public interest organization and their client, the firm is 
incentivized to seek control of the litigation to mitigate the risks of a 
poor monetary return.173  For a public interest organization that 
                                                          
 167. Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1322. 
 168. Id. at 1321 (maintaining that “[n]onmonetary remedies, such as injunctions, 
declaratory relief, and specific performance, become unattractive either because a 
plaintiff has lost interest or because the funder pressures for a simple monetary 
award instead of a socially desirable remedy such as injunction or clean-up”). 
 169. Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 137 (asserting that litigation financing firms 
have investors and shareholders who may hope to achieve a higher return by pushing 
for an early settlement of a case); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text 
(explaining the various players in the industry and how the firms seek profit for their 
own investors).  
 170. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 489–90.  
 171. See Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the Litigation-Investment 
Agreement:  The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms when the Deal Breaks Down, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1851 n.44 (2013) (analogizing these conflict-of-interest problems 
in the funder-client relationship to the insurance context). 
 172. See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 134 (explaining that litigation financing 
firms have not embraced class actions and have stuck to funding commercial 
litigation cases because of fears of being portrayed as either stirring up litigation or 
causing ethical problems in the attorney-client relationship). 
 173. See Sebok & Wendel, supra note 171, at 1853 (asserting that a litigation 
financing firm’s lack of control is “not a risk per se,” so long as the investor remains 
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brings litigation to make an impact, this is an untenable solution to its 
financial challenges. 
Nevertheless, there is at least one rare, albeit telling, example of a 
litigation financing firm advancing funds to a public interest 
organization in the environmental context.  In 1993, an indigenous 
population brought suit in Ecuador, as well as New York, claiming 
that Texaco—which was later bought by Chevron—polluted the 
Amazon rainforest during its oil extraction from 1964 to 1992.174  
After their case was dismissed in New York, the plaintiffs, aided by an 
American attorney named Steven Donzinger, secured a judgment 
against Chevron in Ecuador for $17.2 billion.175  In an effort to 
enforce this sizable judgment, the Ecuadorean plaintiffs, acting 
through the efforts of Donzinger, sought funding from Burford 
Capital, a specialized, New York-based litigation-financing firm.176  In 
turn, Burford brought in outside litigation counsel from a 
Washington, D.C.-based law firm.177  The agreement and relationship 
between these parties was described in an extensive Washington Post 
article, indicating that Burford originally invested $15 million in the 
litigation in exchange for 5.545% of any recovery and a minimum 
return of $55.5 million.178  Eventually, however, revelations came to 
light about the underlying scientific report on the Ecuadorean 
environmental damage, leading to a Chevron-brought lawsuit against 
Steven Donzinger for racketeering.179  This litigation led to disclosure 
of Donzinger’s case files, which revealed a litigation financing 
contract set up between Burford, a non-profit—“Friends of the 
Defense of the Amazon”—and the individual plaintiffs.180 
                                                          
“confident that the claim owner’s interests aligned with his own,” allowing the 
investor to forgo control of the litigation and “free ride off of the litigant’s efforts”). 
 174. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 175. Id. at 234–36. 
 176. See Steve Mufson, Why Chevron Is Suing One of D.C.’s Most Powerful Lobbying 
Firms Over . . . the Amazon Jungle?, WASH. POST (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/02/why-chevron-is-
suing-one-of-d-c-s-most-powerful-lobbying-firms-over-the-amazon-jungle (providing a 
description of the lawsuit). 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. 
 180. See Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How Investors 
Back Lawsuits, FORBES (June 7, 2011, 7:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
danielfisher/2011/06/07/litigation-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-back-
lawsuits (explaining the background of the Chevron litigation and the federal court 
ruling that eventually resulted in the public disclosure of the contract between 
Burford and the plaintiffs). 
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The contract between Burford and the Ecuadorean plaintiffs raises 
a number of interesting questions on how to best structure a 
litigation finance agreement.  A full provision-by-provision analysis of 
this arrangement is available,181 but two provisions of the contract are 
particularly striking and relevant to this Comment.  First, the contract 
rejected any fiduciary duty182 between the litigation financing firm 
and the plaintiff.183  This is notable, because a fiduciary duty would 
have the potential to curtail a litigation financing firm’s excessive 
influence over attorneys or exercise of control over litigation.184  
Second, the contract’s definition of “award,” from which Burford 
would eventually have taken a share, includes any monetary, as well as 
nonmonetary relief, such as a cleanup or prevention measure.185  The 
                                                          
 181. See generally Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 465–79 
(providing a case study of the Burford’s contract with the plaintiffs in the Chevron–
Ecuador case and comparing its provisions to a venture capital’s firm investment). 
 182. A fiduciary duty is the highest contractual relationship that can be embraced 
by parties.  It is defined as “[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and 
candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary” and “a duty to act with the highest 
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the 
other person . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009). 
 183. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 469 n.40 (explaining the 
contract’s provisions that explicitly reject any joint partnership between the 
funder and the plaintiff, including a fiduciary duty); see also TRECA FIN. 
SOLUTIONS (AS THE FUNDER) & CLAIMANTS, FUNDING AGREEMENT § 16.4 (2010) 
[hereinafter TRECA AGREEMENT], available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ 
chevron_fundingagreement.pdf (“The Parties agree that nothing in this Agreement 
shall give rise to or be construed to create a fiduciary, lawyer-client, agency or other 
relationship between the Parties or between their counsel, notwithstanding the 
information or observations or opinions that may be shared between them.”). 
 184. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 740 
(explaining that “[t]he best tool to minimize the conflicts created by profit 
concerns  . . . in favor of the plaintiff is a fiduciary duty[,]” but that “[c]reating such a 
duty would not be a panacea as it would be offset by the funders’ duty to its shareholders” 
(emphasis added)). 
 185. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 468–69 
(summarizing and quoting the contract’s definition of award); see also TRECA 
AGREEMENT, supra note 183, sched. 3.  
For the avoidance of doubt, “Award” shall include (without limitation) 
any cash or non-cash value or benefit conveyed to, or any cash or non-
cash obligation imposed on or accepted by, any person or entity in 
connection with the Claim or the resolution or termination thereof, 
including (without limitation) the value of, or any obligation to perform or 
conduct, any investigation or other assessment (including (without limitation) to 
assess risk to any human or the environment), clean-up, remediation, or 
mitigation or prevention or measures arising from or relating to the Claim 
(including (without limitation) any adverse impacts underlying the Claim). 
TRECA AGREEMENT, supra note 183, sched. 3. (emphasis added). 
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effect of this provision was clear—“if a court awards remedial 
measures for the benefit of the harmed community, the [non-profit 
and individual plaintiffs as claimholder] must pay the monetary value 
of the Funder’s portion of such remedial measures.”186  This reveals 
another possible issue with the for-profit litigation financing firm’s 
involvement in public interest litigation.  Even if the prospect of an 
award is large enough for the financing firm to get involved in a 
given case, it might fund only the litigant’s pursuit of monetary relief, 
leaving any non-monetary relief to come out of the plaintiffs’ share of 
the proceeds.187  In many ways then, a litigation financing firm’s 
interest in the case begins and ends with its potential for profit. 
2. An uncertain regulatory scheme:  Broader legal concerns for the industry 
The for-profit litigation finance industry has also failed to fund 
public interest organizations (and provide access to justice) because 
it operates under an uncertain regulatory regime.  This uncertainty is 
due to two primary issues:  (1) champerty, a common law doctrine 
that purports to prohibit third-parties from financing and profiting 
from litigation; and (2) concerns that disclosures to the financing 
firm by the plaintiff’s attorney may waive protection of the attorney-
client privilege and the attorney-work product doctrine. 
Champerty is a common law doctrine that places the enforceability 
of litigation contracts in considerable doubt.  “A champertous 
agreement is one in which an owner of a legal claim and a third, 
unrelated party agree to divide amongst themselves the proceeds of a 
litigation, if successful.”188  In many ways, champerty is a holdover of 
the past—it originated in English feudal society as a way of 
preventing wealthy individuals from burdening courts with a less 
wealthy person’s claims to land in return for a slice of that land if 
successful.189  Nevertheless, the doctrine came to the United States 
through the common law as various states sought to prevent 
                                                          
 186. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 470. 
 187. See Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 740 
n.120 (explaining that “Burford’s investment in the Chevron–Ecuador dispute . . . 
penalized plaintiffs for receiving clean-ups rather than funds by requiring them to 
pay the funder for its pro-rated share of such a remedy”). 
 188. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 486. 
 189. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 10; see also 
Joshua G. Richey, Comment, Tilted Scales of Justice?  The Consequences of Third-Party 
Financing of American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489, 503 (2013) (explaining that the 
feudal-era champerty doctrine was established to deal with the practice whereby a 
litigant, backed by a wealthy third party, would sue for property rights that he did not 
own but nevertheless extract a favorable verdict by overwhelming the court system). 
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“speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or financial 
overreaching by a party of [a] superior bargaining position.”190  The 
doctrine laid dormant for a number of years until civil rights 
opponents, partly in response to the success of the Brown litigation, 
attempted to use the doctrine to prohibit the NAACP from soliciting 
clients and financing lawsuits for its test case strategy.191  Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court stepped in to protect the NAACP’s right to solicit 
plaintiffs for potential litigation under the First Amendment.192  
However, the Court later held that the prohibition on champerty, as 
applied to a lawyer’s broader “procurement of remunerative 
employment [was] only marginally affected with First Amendment 
concerns” and “falls within the State’s proper sphere of economic 
and professional regulation.”193 
As it applies today in a number of states, champerty completely 
bars a litigation financing firm’s agreement with the plaintiff.  For 
example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to enforce a 
litigation financing agreement and refused to abandon the champerty 
doctrine even if other devices protected litigants.194  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio specifically found a contract champertous 
and unenforceable because it “prolong[ed] litigation and reduce[ed] 
settlement incentives.”195  The Ohio court also found it particularly 
disturbing that the disputed agreement explicitly stated that the 
financing company should earn “substantial profit” on the contract.196 
                                                          
 190. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997). 
 191. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1287 (contending that the 
champerty doctrine in the United States was used by opponents of civil rights to 
“stifle social progress”); see also Comment, The South’s Amended Barratry Laws:  An 
Attempt to End Group Pressure Through the Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1613 (1963) 
(detailing a number of southern states that in the 1950s “suddenly discovered a need 
to reinvigorate and extend existing champerty” with a “flurry of legislation”).  
Interestingly, the comment asserts that this was done in part to respond to civil rights 
groups’ successful litigation.  Id. at 1613. 
 192. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419, 437 (1963) (holding that a Virginia 
statute banning “the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business,” as 
applied to the NAACP’s legal efforts, constituted a violation of “the Fourteenth 
Amendment by unduly inhibiting protected freedoms of expression and 
association”).  
 193. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978). 
 194. Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“Although 
there are safeguards in place to alleviate the potential evils associated with 
champertous agreements, respondent fails to provide a compelling reason to 
completely abandon the doctrine.”). 
 195. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003). 
 196. Id. 
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Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions have limited the doctrine 
to allow the litigation financing industry to establish itself in the 
United States.  This trend, however, is not uniform.197  In 
Massachusetts, for instance, the state’s highest court explicitly 
questioned whether champerty “continues to serve any useful 
purpose” and struck down the doctrine in light of an agreement 
where an individual fronted the costs of litigation.198  The court 
reasoned that other mechanisms exist to address concerns with 
litigation financing agreements, such as the prohibition on excessive 
fees, misconduct sanctions, regulations against frivolous lawsuits, and 
contract “doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and good faith, 
[which] establish standards of fair dealing between opposing 
parties.”199  A number of states have since followed suit, and in 2011, 
the ABA signaled its agreement with this reasoning.200 
In other states, champerty still reigns but applies narrowly.  In a 
White Paper on the subject, the ABA summarized how champerty 
currently impact litigation finance, and found that a number of states 
allow funders to take a share of litigation proceeds so long as the 
arrangement is not: 
(1) clearly promoting “frivolous” litigation (e.g. a lawsuit . . . that does 
vindicate a genuine legal interest of the party bringing the suit); 
(2) engaging in “malice champerty,” which is the support of 
meritorious litigation motivated by an improper motive (e.g. prima 
facie tort in NY); [or] 
(3) “intermeddling” with the conduct of the litigation (e.g. 
determining trial strategy or controlling settlement).201 
New York is particularly illustrative of this approach to the 
champerty doctrine.202  There, the champerty doctrine is part of the 
                                                          
 197. See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 134–35 (noting that while Australia has 
largely done away with champerty, the United States has not conclusively answered 
whether champerty is implicated by litigation finance and only eliminated the 
“antiquated” doctrine in some states).  
 198. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997) (finding that the 
overall “decline of champerty . . . is symptomatic of a fundamental change in society’s 
view of litigation[,] [turning] from a social ill . . . [that] should be minimized to a 
socially useful way to resolve disputes” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 199. Id. at 1226–27. 
 200. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 9 
(concluding that because “existing ethical and legal obligations of lawyers and their 
clients . . . insure that litigation be conducted in good faith and non-frivolously, it is 
unclear why the historical concerns of the common law would justify today placing 
special burdens on litigation funded by third parties”).  
 201. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE 
LITIGATION FINANCE 12 (2012) [hereinafter COMM’N ON ETHICS, WHITE PAPER]. 
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state’s statutory law.203  Under interpretation of this statute, New York 
courts find an agreement champertous if a claim is “acqui[red]” with 
the “primary purpose” to bring a lawsuit.204  “Willingness to resort to 
litigation, however, will not render a transaction champertous if the 
primary purpose of the transaction is to enforce a legitimate claim . . . .”205  
For this reason, New York does not prohibit litigation financing firms 
from funding a case in exchange for a share of any monetary recovery so 
long as the case is “already in existence” and the litigant does not lose 
control of the case.206  Tellingly, no court in the state has yet held that a 
litigation finance contract amounts to champerty,207 but the doctrine’s 
applicability remains anything but clear.208 
Lastly, a litigation financing firm’s involvement in a case may 
implicate waiver of attorney-client privilege and the protection of the 
attorney-work product doctrine.  Attorney-client privilege protects 
                                                          
 202. See generally Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 
141, at 725–28 (reviewing champerty case law in New York). 
 203. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2004) (“No person . . . shall solicit, buy or 
take an assignment of, or be in any manner interested in buying or taking an 
assignment of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing 
in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an 
action or proceeding thereon . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 204. SB Schwartz & Co. v. Levine, 918 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (App. Div. 2011). 
 205. Id. at 173.  New York courts also maintain that a transaction will not 
constitute champerty “if the party obtaining the claim . . . does so as part of a 
larger transaction and the intent to commence litigation is incidental to that 
larger transaction.” Id.  
 206. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 727; see 
also Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 117–18 (2011) 
(detailing the New York approach to champerty and reviewing cases).  In particular, 
Professor Sebok explains that the New York doctrine “is concerned almost exclusively 
with contracts made before the lawsuit is filed.”  Id.  at 118.  This rule serves as a 
“rough proxy” for indicating that the litigant “truly desired to have his or her right 
vindicated, and was not influenced by the encouragement of a stranger (whose 
encouragement may have taken the form of a bribe).”  Id. at 118–19.  Professor 
Sebok goes on to question why this matters so long as the underlying claims have 
merit. Id. at 119. 
 207. Formal Op. 2011-2, supra note 137.   
 208. For example, one court implied that a plaintiff’s adding of new claims to an 
amended complaint after a financing agreement could constitute champerty.  See 
Richbell Info. Servs., Inc. v. Jupiter Partners, 723 N.Y.S.2d 134, 138 (App. Div. 2001) 
(noting that after a claim was assigned to another party an “amended complaint 
[was] filed . . . [that] was more than three times as long as the original complaint and 
alleged 21 new causes of action and that the assertion of new claims against 
defendants based on the assignment was exactly what [section] 489 was intended to 
avoid”); see also Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 
727 n.65 (characterizing the case as “potentially problematic for litigation financiers 
regardless of deal structure”).  
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information shared by the plaintiffs with their attorneys, but it is 
possibly waived if later disclosed to third parties.209  Attorney-work 
product doctrine protects the lawyer’s case materials and impressions 
of the case from discovery,210 but that protection can fail if materials 
are disclosed in a way that risks the information getting into the 
hands of a litigant’s opponents.211  Litigation financing firms, 
however, need information about the litigation to initially invest and 
monitor their investment in the case.212  For this reason, there are 
concerns that a lawyer’s communications with litigation financing 
firms could risk waiver of the attorney-client privilege if there is not a 
“common-interest” between the firm and the plaintiff.213  Like the 
champerty doctrine, the application of this “common-interest 
exception” to the relationship between funders and the plaintiff is 
inconsistent across many jurisdictions.214  However, the doctrine of 
                                                          
 209. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, WHITE PAPER, supra note 201, at 35 (stating that 
information shared with a person other than a “privileged person” waives the 
protection of the attorney client privilege and opens such information up to 
discovery).  This discovery rule is closely related but separate from the duty of 
confidentiality owed by lawyers to their clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6 (2014) (prohibiting a lawyer from disclosing information relating to 
representation unless informed consent is obtained, it is implied in order to represent 
the client, or an exception applies, such as the potential for risk of harm or death). 
 210. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)–(B) (“Ordinarily, a party may not 
discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative . . . [if] the court 
orders discovery of those materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other 
representative concerning the litigation.”). 
 211. See Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2012) (explaining that disclosure of attorney-
work product can waive protection “if the client or lawyer or a representative of 
either discloses the materials voluntarily to the adversary or discloses the materials in 
a way that substantially increase[s] the opportunities for potential adversaries to 
obtain the information” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 212. See Formal Op. 2011-2, supra note 137 (explaining that the risk of waiver of 
the attorney-work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege occurs when a 
litigation financing firm requests information in its due diligence process or includes 
contract provisions that require information or documents to be shared by the lawyer 
with the firm).  But see Molot, supra note 130, at 186 (recognizing that a “good 
funder” will use his own judgment to analyze a case because attorneys “have strong 
incentives to paint as rosy a picture of the merits as possible”). 
 213. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, WHITE PAPER, supra note 201, at 36 (suggesting that a 
court may reason that the information is privileged because the funder itself is a 
“privileged party” in addition to the attorney and client, or that there is a “common 
interest” between the funder and the plaintiff in the litigation’s outcome). 
 214. See, e.g., Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (holding that attorney-client privilege is not waived when 
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attorney work product has generally been thought of as providing 
greater protection to attorneys sharing their thoughts and materials 
regarding an ongoing case with a third-party.215  As such, an attorney 
who shares work product with a litigation funder likely does not waive 
protection so long as the he enters into a nondisclosure agreement 
with the funder and any other parties who receive such information.216 
In sum, the current for-profit litigation finance industry provides 
little recourse to the public interest organization in its litigation 
efforts.  As detailed above, this can be seen as an issue of misaligned 
incentives:  litigation financing firms, motivated by profit and the 
shareholder maximization norm, are simply not interested in public 
interest litigation that emphasize non-monetary relief and symbolic 
victory over large damage awards.217  Additionally, public interest 
organizations may shy away from for-profit litigation financing 
because the funder’s monetary interests may lead to associated 
pressures that do not always align with the organization’s social 
impact goals and the plaintiff’s often mixed interests.218  Even when a 
case offers a large enough prospect of an award, a litigation financing 
firm may still disclaim any interest in non-monetary relief or a 
                                                          
plaintiff’s lawyer provided documents to litigation financing firm because of a 
“common interest” between the plaintiff and funder).  But see Miller UK Ltd. v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) 
(finding litigation financing firm, who, “for their part, were interested in profit[s],” 
were not in a “common legal interest” with the plaintiffs and that “materials shared 
with any actual or prospective funders lost whatever attorney-client privilege they 
might otherwise have enjoyed”). 
 215. See Miller, 2014 WL 67340, at *16 (finding that the application of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine varies in the case law because the 
objective of the attorney-client privilege is to protect communication between the 
lawyer and his client while the work product doctrine protects the lawyer’s internal 
thoughts and strategy from opposing litigants).  
 216. See Giesel, supra note 211, at 1087 (concluding that “materials that evaluate 
litigation, even if created in the [litigation-finance] setting, are likely protected by 
the work-product doctrine” so long as the litigation financing firm “enters into a 
binding nondisclosure agreement with regard to any shared materials” and does not 
take actions that risk disclosing the information to the opponent in the case). The 
Miller court also recently embraced this reasoning. See Miller, 2014 WL 67340, at *18 
(suggesting that a “confidentiality agreement may be a sufficient but not a necessary 
element of a finding of nonwaiver” of the attorney work-product protection in the 
litigation finance context). 
 217. See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text (discussing the litigation 
financing firms’ incentives are not properly aligned with public interest 
organizations due to its strictly for-profit motivations).  
 218. See supra notes 162–72 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the 
type of control that a litigation financing firm may seek over a piece of litigation to 
ensure a monetary return). 
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fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.219  Lastly, the for-profit industry 
operates under some considerable uncertainty because of the uneven 
application of the champerty doctrine and lingering questions 
regarding attorney-client privilege or the doctrine of attorney work 
product.220  The question, then, becomes whether there is a middle 
ground between the for-profit and non-profit donor models of 
funding public interest litigation, and whether any such solution may 
mitigate some of the issues that inhibit the for-profit litigation 
finance industry from facilitating access to justice and private 
enforcement of the law. 
III. SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN FOR-
PROFIT AND NON-PROFIT SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Social entrepreneurship is a recent trend developing in the United 
States that “tak[es] root in a fertile space between the for-profit and 
nonprofit worlds.”221  While the term itself is meant to include any 
effort that creates a social benefit,222 it is widely associated with the 
critique on for-profit firms that elevate shareholder value over wider 
concerns for stakeholders (i.e. customers and employees) and the 
environment.223  Finding that corporate responsibility efforts have 
largely failed,224 social entrepreneurs employ, inter alia, two strategies 
in their effort to widen the concerns of corporate governance and 
alleviate social ills—impact investing and social enterprise.225  Impact 
investing, as its name implies, is an investment practice whereby 
individuals set up “institutional funds [that] take into account 
nonfinancial and social benefit considerations when screening 
potential investment opportunities by either avoiding companies 
                                                          
 219. See supra notes 174–87 and accompanying text (detailing two provisions of a 
litigation finance contract between a funder and public interest organization).   
 220. See supra notes 209–16 and accompanying text (providing a short description 
of state of the law of champerty, attorney work-product, and attorney-client privilege 
in the context of litigation finance). 
 221. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 337, 342 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 222. Esposito, supra note 16, at 647. 
 223. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder 
maximization norm).  
 224. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 656 (asserting that corporate responsibility 
reporting, which involves third-party certification that the firm is providing social 
benefits, “is increasingly recognized for what it is—a public relations tool that pays lip 
service to increased corporate transparency but does little, if anything, to alter the 
corporate decision-making process”). 
 225. Id. at 647. 
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engaged in socially or environmentally harmful activities or actively 
seeking companies engaged in positive pursuits.”226  It may also 
include more traditional investors who take greater notice of the 
social consequences of the businesses in which they invest,227 or see 
investment opportunity in areas once occupied exclusively by non-
profits.228  Regardless, impact investing promises to be a growing 
industry in the United States.229 
If impact investing refers to the source of socially conscious 
financing, social enterprise may well refer to the recipient of such 
funding.  Specifically, social enterprises are newly formed business 
entities that aim to achieve not solely shareholder maximization but 
instead “‘double-bottom-line’ (financial and social) or ‘triple bottom-
line’ (financial, social, and environmental) results.”230  Interestingly, 
this move has resulted in large part from the frustrations associated 
with the “for-profit/non-profit dichotomy” of today’s business 
entities, namely, that for-profit firms are generally expected to 
pursue shareholder maximization, and non-profits can have 
broader social goals but may not distribute profits to investors.231  
Consequently, state legislatures recently passed a number of laws 
that allow for incorporation of social enterprises, including the 
flexible benefit corporation, low-profit limited liability company, 
and the benefit corporation.232 
                                                          
 226. Id. at 647–48. 
 227. See Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations:  How to Enforce a Mandate to 
Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 583, 602–13 (2012) (noting that 
traditional investors fearing ramifications of “poor social or environmental 
performance, or wanting to promote social change as an end in itself, are 
increasingly screening corporations’ nonfinancial performance” (footnotes omitted)). 
 228. See Antony Bugg-Levine et al., A New Approach to Funding Social Enterprises:  
Unbundling Societal Benefits and Financial Returns Can Dramatically Increase Investment, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 3, 4 (“An increasing number of social entrepreneurs 
and investors are coming to realize that social enterprises of all sorts can also 
generate financial returns that will make them attractive to the right investors.”). 
 229. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 643–44 (noting a 13% increase in assets backed 
by “sustainable” and “socially responsible investing,” as well as an estimated 10 year 
profit potential of $183 to $667 billion on these investments); see also Murray, supra 
note 15, at 48 (indicating traditional investment firms and high net worth individuals 
believe impact investing will grow in the coming years). 
 230. Kelley, supra note 221, at 339. 
 231. Esposito, supra note 16, at 644; see also J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets 
on a Procrustean Bed:  How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, The Dangers 
Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 90 (2012) (explaining the 
roots of social enterprise lie in the limits of the non-profit solution to social problems). 
 232. See generally MORRISON FOERSTER & TRUSTLAW CONNECT, WHICH LEGAL 
STRUCTURE IS RIGHT FOR MY SOCIAL ENTERPRISE?  A GUIDE TO ESTABLISHING A SOCIAL 
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The benefit corporation, in particular, illustrates how statutory law 
attempts to find a balance between the for-profit and social goals of 
social enterprise.  State law mandates that a benefit corporation 
embrace a public benefit broader than profit-maximization233 but also 
permits the entity to earn a monetary return and raise capital like a 
traditional corporation.234  The investors may be either traditional 
investors or impact investors.235  To ensure that the benefit 
corporation does not abrogate its responsibility to pursue a public 
benefit, the benefit corporation has two principal features:  it 
“expands [a director’s] fiduciary duty to require consideration of 
nonfinancial interests,”236 and imposes requirements on the corporation 
to report on its performance in achieving its public benefit.237 
Much of the literature elevates the benefit corporation as offering 
the most potential for businesses pursuing a social benefit.238  Not 
only is the entity already embraced in a number of states,239 but the 
                                                          
ENTERPRISE IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (2013) (providing an overview of traditional 
corporate forms as well as possible social enterprises and hybrid ventures). 
 233. See generally William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit 
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
817, 839 (2012) (asserting that one of the defining characteristics of a benefit 
corporation is the obligation to create a “general public benefit,” which contrasts 
with traditional corporations that may “form for any lawful purpose, but have no 
explicit purpose requirement”).  
 234. See Benefit Corp and Nonprofits, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, 
http://benefitcorp.net/what-makes-benefit-corp-different/benefit-corp-and-
nonprofits (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (recognizing that while non-profits receive 
donations, a benefit corporation allows for equity or debt investment that earns a 
return for investors). 
 235. See William H. Clark, Jr. et al., The Need and Rationale for the Benefit 
Corporation:  Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social 
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 28 (Jan. 18, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/ 
Benecit_Corporation_White_Paper_1_18_2013.pdf (noting that benefit corporations 
can attract capital in the same manner as for-profit corporations, but may also 
appeal to the growing community of impact investors looking for a social return 
on their investments).  
 236. Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 838. 
 237. See id. at 842 (indicating that benefit corporations require reports on social 
performance in order to ensure proper monitoring of directors).  
 238. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 16, at 707 (denoting the benefit corporation as 
“the most promising entity” because it allows for a “mixture of specifically defined 
social or environment corporate purposes, transparency, accountability, flexibility, 
and limited liability for social entrepreneurs”).  But see Callison, supra note 231, at 92 
(arguing that the benefit corporation is inadequate for many corporations and must 
be more flexible to accommodate different business strategies).   
 239. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) 
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benefit corporation has also followed a relatively uniform approach 
due to the organizational efforts of B Lab.240  This non-profit 
organization has pushed for states to adopt model legislation as 
demand for social enterprises has increased.241  While some have 
criticized the limitations of the benefit corporation as laid out in the 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model Legislation” or 
“Model”),242 this Comment does not delve deeply into this debate.  
Instead, it considers how such an entity may help alleviate funding 
issues in a specific legal practice.  As this Comment charts a path 
forward for social entrepreneurs looking to invest in public interest 
litigation, a review of the main provisions of the Model Legislation 
and the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation is useful. 
A. The Benefit Corporation Model Legislation 
The Model Legislation makes clear that the benefit corporation is a 
status that overlays the traditional for-profit corporation, subject to 
the traditional corporate laws of the state adopting its provision.243  
To become a benefit corporation, a newly formed corporation 
must state in its articles of incorporation that it is a benefit 
corporation;244 existing corporations may become a benefit 
corporation through an amendment process or by merging with 
an existing benefit corporation.245 
Central to the Model is the requirement that a benefit corporation, 
in addition to fulfilling its purpose under the state’s traditional 
incorporation statute, must have the “purpose of creating a general 
benefit.”246  This general benefit is broadly defined as a “material 
                                                          
(providing a frequently updated list of the recent states that have embraced the 
benefit corporation and those with pending legislation).  As of this article, the 
benefit corporation has been embraced by twenty-seven states with pending 
legislation in thirteen other states.  Id. 
 240. See The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-
are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).  B Lab 
describes itself as a “501(c)3 nonprofit that serves a global movement of 
entrepreneurs using the power of business to solve social and environmental 
problems.”  Id.  B Lab also has a certification called the B Corporation, which is distinct 
from the Model Legislation and the corporate entity embraced by state statues.  Id. 
 241. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION (2012); Callison, supra note 231, at 98 
(remarking that state statutes derive from B-Lab’s Model Legislation).  
 242. See Callison, supra note 231, at 98, 104–05 (discussing the weaknesses of 
the B-Lab Model). 
 243. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101(c). 
 244. Id. § 103. 
 245. Id. § 104. 
 246. Id. § 201(a). 
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positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, 
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”247  The Model further provides 
an extensive definition as to what constitutes a “third-party 
standard.”248  Importantly, in addition to pursuing the required 
general benefit, a benefit corporation may elect to include in its 
articles of incorporation the identification of “one or more specific 
public benefits that it is the purpose of the benefit corporation to 
create.”249  These “optional” specific benefits are further defined 
under the Model, providing a non-exhaustive list that the benefit 
corporation may adopt.250 
In an effort to ensure the benefit corporation carries out its 
general and specific benefit, the Model mandates that the board of 
directors, committees, and individual officers “shall consider the 
effects of any action or inaction” on not only the interests of 
shareholders of the benefit corporation, but also various 
stakeholders—including the customers as “beneficiaries of the 
general public benefit or specific public benefit,” the environment, 
the community in which the business is located, and the employees of 
the company.251  Directors who fail to create the general benefit 
                                                          
 247. Id. § 102. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. § 201(b). 
 250. Id. § 102.  The Model’s possible specific benefits include:   
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities 
with beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic 
opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs 
in the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring the 
environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts, 
sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of 
capital to entities with a purpose to benefit society or the environment; 
and (7) conferring any other particular benefit on society or the 
environment. 
Id. 
 251. Id. § 301(a)(1) (emphasis added).  The specific language of the statute states 
that the director must consider:   
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and 
work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers; 
(iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public 
benefit or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation; 
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community 
in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or 
its suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the 
short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including 
benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term 
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cannot incur any monetary liability,252 and there is an explicit provision 
stating that directors have no duty to any person that may be a 
beneficiary of the general or opted-in specific benefits.253  Moreover, 
the duty to consider various stakeholders and their interests is subject 
to the protection of the business judgment rule.254 
Nevertheless, the Act also sets out to modify the fiduciary duties 
owed by a director, explicitly stating that consideration of the general 
or specific benefits does not constitute a violation of those duties 
owed to the corporation and shareholders.255  These provisions are 
essential, as they ensure “directors who consider the enumerated 
factors are insulated from shareholder claims that they breached 
their fiduciary duties by not acting to maximize shareholder 
benefit.”256  Additionally, the Model also allows for a “benefit 
enforcement proceeding,”257 providing that a shareholder may “bring 
a legal action on the basis that the director failed to pursue the stated 
general or specific public benefits, failed to consider the interests of 
the various stakeholders set forth in the statute, or failed to meet the 
                                                          
plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the 
continued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability 
of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit 
purpose and any specific public benefit purpose. 
Id.  
 252. Id. § 301(c).  This allows for injunctive relief to still be brought against the 
individual director.  See Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 848–49 (discussing how 
monetary liability was restricted due to the difficulty in monetizing general and 
specific benefits and “to focus courts on the exclusive remedy of awarding injunctive 
relief wherein the benefit corporation would be required to simply live up to the 
commitments it voluntarily undertook”). 
 253. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(d) (“A director does not have a duty 
to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a specific 
public benefit purpose of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person 
as a beneficiary.”). 
 254. Id. § 301(e) (“A director who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills 
the duty under this section if the director:  (1) is not interested in the subject of the 
business judgment; (2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business 
judgment to the extent the director reasonably believes to be appropriate under the 
circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best 
interests of the benefit corporation.”). 
 255. Id. § 301(b)(1).  
 256. Callison, supra note 231, at 96. 
 257. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(a) (“Except in a benefit 
enforcement proceeding, no person may bring an action or assert a claim against a 
benefit corporation or its directors or officers with respect to:  (1) failure to pursue 
or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit set forth in its articles 
of incorporation; or (2) violation of an obligation, duty, or standard of conduct 
under this [chapter].”). 
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transparency requirements in the statute.”258  While a stakeholder, such 
as a customer or client of the benefit corporation, has no ability to 
bring a benefit enforcement proceeding against a director for failing 
to effectuate the corporation’s stated purpose,259 shareholders 
nevertheless have the right to bring an enforcement proceeding on 
the basis that a stakeholder’s interests are not being considered.260 
Lastly, a director is also required to assemble an annual public 
benefit report that details how the benefit corporation’s general or 
specific benefits were created, how the third-party standard was met, 
and the ways in which the corporation fell short of its goal.261  This 
report must be made available to the public.262 
B. The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Statute 
On July 17, 2013, Governor Jack Markell signed a law authorizing 
creation of the “public benefit corporations” (“PBCs”) in Delaware.263  
At its core, the Delaware PBC has many of the same features as the 
benefit corporation under the Model put forth by B Lab.264  Just as 
the Model requires the benefit corporation to pursue a “general 
                                                          
 258. Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 849–50.  
 259. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(c) (limiting standing in a benefit 
enforcement proceeding to shareholders, directors, officers and those stated in the 
corporation’s bylaws). 
 260. See Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 850 (stating that the Model provides 
that shareholder can “bring an action for failure to consider other stakeholder 
interests (e.g., for failure of the directors to adequately consider the impact of a 
particular action on the workforce of the company)”); Esposito, supra note 16, at 700 
(discussing how a benefit corporation’s stakeholders have no right to sue but that 
“shareholders of benefit corporations are given an expanded right of action to 
enforce [the] additional duty to consider stakeholder interests”).  For a particularly 
interesting viewpoint of these provisions, see Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism 
Through the Benefit Corporation:  Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect 
Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 898–99 (2013) (arguing that the 
benefit enforcement proceeding is a substantive guarantee because a director’s 
business decisions can be challenged, but also a procedural guarantee, “in the sense 
that the board of directors must make some affirmative, evidentiary showing of non-
shareholder consideration for all material decisions when challenged in a benefit 
enforcement proceeding”).  
 261. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1)–(2). 
 262. Id. § 402(b). 
 263. Daniel Fisher, Delaware “Public Benefit Corporation” Lets Directors Serve Three 
Masters Instead of One, FORBES (July 16, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
danielfisher/2013/07/16/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-lets-directors-serve-
three-masters-instead-of-one. 
 264. For a more detailed comparison, see Specifics on Delaware Benefit Corporation 
Legislation, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/ 
Delaware_Public_Benefit_Legislation_Specifics.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
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benefit,” a Delaware PBC is “intended to produce a public benefit” 
and “to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”265 
The Delaware PBC, however, differs in a number of respects.  First, 
it requires the benefit corporation to identify in its certificate of 
incorporation one or more specific benefits that it seeks to promote.266  
This potentially provides greater specificity for shareholders who 
invest in the company and want to enforce the social purpose of the 
enterprise.267  Second, the Delaware PBC strips the benefit 
corporation of the heavily criticized mandatory third-party standard 
requirements,268 allowing the PBC to simply opt for third-party 
assessment in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws if it so 
chooses.269  Likewise, the biennial benefit report is not required to be 
public or evaluated by any third party standard; it is provided only to 
shareholders of the corporation.270  Lastly, the PBC, unlike the 
                                                          
 265. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013). 
 266. Id. § 362(a)(1) (stating that the corporation must “[i]dentify within its 
statement of business or purpose . . . 1 or more specific public benefits to be 
promoted by the corporation” (emphasis added)).  Additionally, the statute defines a 
public benefit as a “positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more 
categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in 
their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic, 
charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, 
religious, scientific or technological nature.”  Id. § 362(b). 
 267. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out:  Who’s 
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 256), available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2351&context=f
acpub (noting that the requirement of the public benefit corporation to declare a 
specific benefit “give[s] shareholders control over the mission of the public benefit 
corporation and focus directors on a contractually agreed upon public benefit”). 
 268. See Callison, supra note 231, at 94 (explaining that while “[t]he Model spills 
much ink attempting to define each of these characteristics [of the third-party 
standard], . . . it does not prescribe any content for the standards, . . . [t]hus, it is 
conceivable that some third-party standard-setters will establish very low, but 
transparent, standards for benefit corporations and the whole concept of public 
good will go down the greenwash drain”). 
 269. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c)(2)–(3). 
 270. Id. § 366(b)–(c).  Specifically, the statement should include:   
(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to promote 
such public benefit or public benefits and interests; 
(2) The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure the 
corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit or public 
benefits and interests; 
(3) Objective factual information based on those standards regarding 
the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives for promoting such 
public benefit or public benefits and interests; and 
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Model, is required to feature the acronym in its name271 and clearly 
indicate it is a PBC in any notices or stock certificates to shareholders.272 
The Delaware PBC preserves the flexibility of directors to pursue a 
social purpose, but has a somewhat different approach to holding 
directors accountable for a failure to pursue a public benefit.  Like 
the Model, the Delaware PBC limits the director’s liability for failing 
to create specific benefits, imposes no duties on the director to the 
broader stakeholders in any such benefits, and allows for the business 
judgment rule to protect the director’s decisions.273  Importantly, 
section 365(a) of the Delaware PBC statute also modifies the duties of 
directors by requiring the corporation to be managed “in a manner 
that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best 
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, 
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its 
certificate of incorporation.”274  This resembles the Model 
Legislation’s provisions regarding a director’s duties,275 allowing the 
director a degree of freedom to obviate any duty to maximize 
                                                          
(4) An assessment of the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives 
and promoting such public benefit or public benefits and interests. 
Id. § 366(b). 
 271. Id. § 362(c) (“The name of the public benefit corporation shall, without 
exception, contain the words ‘public benefit corporation,’ or the abbreviation 
‘P.B.C.,’ or the designation ‘PBC,’ which shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements 
of § 102(a)(1)(i) of this title.”). 
 272. Id. § 364 (“Any stock certificate issued by a public benefit corporation shall 
note conspicuously that the corporation is a public benefit corporation formed 
pursuant to this subchapter.”). 
 273. Id. § 365(b) (stating that a director’s decision “implicating the balance 
requirement” satisfies the “director’s fiduciary duties to stockholders and the 
corporation if such director’s decision is both informed and disinterested and not 
such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve”).  Additionally, the 
PBC’s certificate of incorporation may opt into a provision that “any disinterested 
failure to satisfy . . . section [365] shall not . . . constitute an act or omission not in 
good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”  Id. § 365(c). 
 274. Id. § 365(a) (emphasis added).  This language may be stronger than the 
language used in the Model and may require more of directors.  See Cass Brewer, 
Preliminary Observations Concerning Delaware’s New Benefit Corporation Act, SOCENTLAW 
(July 19, 2013), http://socentlaw.com/2013/07/preliminary-observations-concerning- 
delawares-new-benefit-corporation-act (“Delaware require[s] the directors of a 
benefit corporation to ‘balance’ the pecuniary interests of the shareholders with the 
other interests of nonshareholders, whereas the B-Lab mockup only requires 
‘consideration’ of nonshareholder interests.  Only time will tell, but the practical 
difference between ‘balancing’ versus merely ‘considering’ nonshareholder interests 
could be tremendous.”). 
 275. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text 
obligating a director to consider stakeholder interests). 
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shareholder value.276  However, the Delaware law does not embrace 
the Model’s “benefit enforcement proceeding,” but instead allows 
shareholders to maintain a derivative suit to enforce section 365(a) 
of the Act.277  Thus, when a corporation opts to become a PBC, a 
shareholder looking to enforce the specific benefit in the public 
benefit corporation’s certificate of incorporation may bring a 
derivative proceeding to force the corporation to follow its stated 
social purpose.278 
IV. THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY AND POLICY BENEFITS OF A SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE MODEL OF FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
This Comment presents an alternative, social enterprise model of 
funding public interest litigation whereby a litigation financing firm 
organizes as a benefit corporation to provide funding to public 
interest organizations’ litigation efforts in exchange for a share in any 
monetary award or settlement.  The adoption of this social enterprise 
model is legally feasible and addresses a number of the seemingly 
distinct trends outlined above.  Specifically, the model expands 
financing for public interest organizations that are currently 
underfunded in their efforts to provide access to justice and enforce 
private rights of action; mitigates many of the ethical and legal issues 
facing the litigation financing industry, while also bringing its 
benefits to public interest organizations; and allows social 
entrepreneurs to pursue their goals in the judicial arena while 
making a modest return on their investment. 
This section will proceed in three parts.  First, a hypothetical model 
is provided to illustrate how a litigation financing firm organized as a 
social enterprise is a legally feasible alternative to the non-profit and 
                                                          
 276. See Plerhoples, supra note 267, at 256 (asserting that a director, in an effort to 
shield himself from a derivative suit by shareholders, may argue “that such a broad 
balancing requirement [in 365(a)] encompasses many interests (even those that 
conflict with shareholders’ monetary interests) and any public benefit” regardless of 
the one specified in the company’s charter). 
 277. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (providing that the “[s]tockholders of a public 
benefit corporation owning individually or collectively, as of the date of instituting 
such derivative suit, at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in the 
case of a corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser 
of such percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market value, may maintain a 
derivative lawsuit to enforce the requirements set forth in § 365(a) of this title”). 
 278. See Plerhoples, supra note 267, at 257 (noting that “the Delaware statute does 
not reference any separate procedure.  This might imply that a  derivative lawsuit is 
the appropriate action against the directors of a public benefit corporation for 
failure to pursue a public benefit”). 
WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  8:10 PM 
2014] LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 433 
for-profit models of financing public interest litigation.  Particular 
attention is focused on how a litigation financing firm can 
incorporate as a benefit corporation to carry out (and enforce) its 
purpose to finance public interest litigation.  Second, it will examine 
the Delaware PBC statute and its advantages for parties devoted to 
financing public interest litigation.  Third, it will explore the public 
policy benefits by illustrating how the social enterprise model 
ameliorates some of the legal issues that currently prevent the 
broader for-profit litigation financing industry from facilitating 
greater access to justice and private enforcement of the law. 
A. Public Interest Litigation Financing as a Social Enterprise Model 
Given the limits of the non-profit and for-profit models to provide 
litigation financing to public interest organizations, a social 
entrepreneur should instead turn to a social enterprise that broadens 
the current sources of funding for public interest organizations, yet 
minimizes the problems associated with a purely profit-oriented 
approach to litigation financing.  This arrangement could be set up 
as follows.  A social entrepreneur organizes and incorporates a closely 
held,279 litigation financing firm as a benefit corporation with the 
specific purpose of investing in litigation brought by public interest 
organizations.280  In turn, this funder attracts capital from the 
                                                          
 279. A closely held corporation is “[a] corporation whose stock is not freely traded 
and is held by only a few shareholders.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (9th ed. 2009).  
For our purposes here, the envisioned entity will be thought of as a closely held 
because such corporations are often more suitable for achieving the goals of social 
enterprises.  See Callison, supra note 231, at 102 (asserting that most benefit 
corporations will be closely held because “[i]t seems relatively unlikely that larger 
corporations, in which shareholders do not share familial or personal connection, 
will comprise a large proportion of the corporations seeking to enable values other 
than shareholder profit-maximization”).  
 280. The Delaware PBC statute requires identification of the specific public benefit 
promoted by the corporation in the certificate of incorporation.  See supra note 266 
and accompanying text (providing the statutory language).  Therefore, the litigation 
financing firm’s certificate of incorporation should state that it is a public benefit 
corporation and identify the specific purpose of providing funding to non-profit, 
public interest organizations’ litigation efforts.  Under the statutory language, this 
public benefit would be a “positive effect” on “entities” of an “economic . . . nature.”  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b).  More specifically, the language in the certificate of 
incorporation could be written as the following:   
In an effort to support legal efforts that promote access to justice, the 
directors of [name of benefit corporation] PBC, after a due diligence 
process, shall establish, as a specific benefit, litigation financing contracts 
with plaintiffs represented by non-profit, public-interest organizations 
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growing community of impact investors, high net worth individuals, 
and other traditional investment firms looking to make both 
monetary and social returns on their investments.281  The benefit 
corporation, as required by its stated specific benefit, then generates 
this social return by entering into litigation financing contracts with 
public interest organizations and their clients who bring impact 
litigation cases, many of which involve the civil rights, environmental, 
human rights, and employment discrimination areas of the law; 
importantly, these cases will often feature a private right of action 
that seeks non-monetary and monetary relief for not only litigants, 
but also society as a whole.282  In return for financing, the benefit 
corporation receives a share in any monetary relief awarded in the 
litigation effort.283  This return is then distributed to the shareholders 
of the benefit corporation or any other investors in the litigation,284 
along with the added “reputational capital” that comes with 
supporting a public interest organization’s pursuit of non-monetary 
                                                          
who have filed class or individual actions on behalf of litigants in the civil 
rights, environmental, or employment discrimination areas of the law.  
This language could be narrowed or broadened depending on the expertise of the 
litigation financing firm and the type of litigation funded.  While outside the scope 
of this paper, the language could also be modified to include public interest law firms 
and other organizations involved in impact litigation.  See supra note 5 (distinguishing 
public interest organizations from a broader “cause lawyering” movement). 
 281. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text (noting the growing “impact 
investment” community looking for a social return on their monetary investments, as 
well as traditional investors that are becoming more interested in such opportunities). 
 282. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (describing the various areas of 
the law in which a private action is often authorized). 
 283. See supra note 126 (detailing the process by which litigation financing firms 
establish contracts with plaintiffs in return for a share of any eventual award). 
 284. Certainly, some public interest cases may not generate the same size damage 
awards seen in commercial litigation currently funded by litigation financing firms, 
which could result in less of a return for traditional investors in the firm.  However, 
social enterprise models attempt to ensure more competitive returns for traditional 
investors by carving out a role for foundational grants to subsidize the investment.  
See infra note 294 (proposing litigation financing firms adopt a new model of 
financing social enterprise).  Additionally, the litigation financing firm could 
contribute its own capital to finance a profitable case, earn a return on its 
investment, and then put those funds towards cases that may make more of a visible 
impact but offer less of a monetary return—a strategy currently utilized by for-profit 
public interest law firms.  See supra note 85 (discussing how public interest law firms 
afford to take on cause-oriented, less profitable cases).  These public interest law 
firms, however, cannot tap into outside investment if the state in which it resides adopts 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct’s prohibition against forming legal 
partnerships with nonlawyers.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2013). 
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relief and broader social impact.285  This basic model is illustrated in 
Diagram A in the Appendix. 
Importantly, the public interest organization will likely maintain its 
non-profit status under this arrangement while also experiencing an 
increased capacity in its clients to pay for services.  Public interest 
organizations often incorporate as non-profits to obtain tax-exempt 
status.286  Per IRS rules, non-profits engaging in litigation may accept 
attorneys’ fees only if “paid directly by its clients.”287  Indeed, if a 
litigation financing firm were to contract with a public interest 
organization to cover its fees in a case, this provision would likely 
pose an obstacle.  However, litigation financing firms already contract 
“directly” with clients, who in turn put the advanced funds toward 
obtaining legal representation.288  In the social enterprise model, 
much of the same arrangement plays out—the benefit corporation 
provides the funds to the client in exchange for a share in any 
monetary recovery; the client then uses these funds to hire a public 
interest organization on retainer, with any balance being refunded 
once the litigation is complete.289  In this fashion, the public interest 
organization is paid directly by the client and the client gains greater 
access to justice. 
Perhaps more importantly, the IRS requires public interest 
organizations to decline cases in which the client has a “sufficient 
                                                          
 285. See Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 158, at 346–48 (proposing 
“nonentrepreneurial model” of “litigation governance” for class action cases in 
Europe whereby instead of relying on a contingent fee arrangement, a public 
interest organization serves as lead plaintiff staking its “reputational capital” on the 
outcome of the case while negotiating with litigation financing firms).  
 286. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining that public interest 
organizations often organize as 501(c)(3) organizations to achieve tax-exempt status). 
 287. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 4.02.  This section also allows fees to be 
paid “by opposing parties [if the fees] are awarded by a court or administrative 
agency.” Id. § 4.01. 
 288. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1291–92 (noting that litigation 
financing firms often contract directly with the client, as opposed to the client’s 
lawyer, in order to avoid implicating the ethical prohibition on splitting fees with 
non-lawyers).  In much the same way, this caution carries over and protects the non-
profit’s tax exempt status.  
 289. The IRS rules governing public interest organizations already allow for such 
an arrangement. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 5.01 (stating that attorneys’ 
fees “may be charged against a retainer, with any balance remaining after the 
conclusion of litigation refunded to the litigant”).  Nevertheless, any fees charged 
must not “exceed the actual cost incurred in each case, viz., the salaries, overhead, 
and other costs fairly allocable to the litigation in question.”  Id.  Additionally, the IRS 
requires that all attorneys’ fees collected over a five-year period “must not exceed 50 
percent of the total cost of operation of the organization's legal functions.” Id. § 4.05. 
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commercial or financial interest in the outcome of the litigation to 
justify retention of a private law firm.”290  Arguably, the presence of a 
strictly for-profit litigation financing firm would indeed indicate that 
the client has a “sufficient commercial or financial interest” in the 
outcome to justify private legal representation.  However, if a benefit 
corporation—an entity required to balance pecuniary and social 
interests291—provides the funding, the public interest organization is 
all the more justified in believing the client lacks the purely financial 
or commercial interests that would otherwise justify private legal 
representation.  In fact, the IRS has considerable leeway to take 
account of such factors.292 
Likewise, the social enterprise model does not involve a dramatic 
reworking of the funding mechanisms already financing public 
interest litigation.  Rather, it broadens the pool of capital to include 
impact investors and traditional investors while preserving an 
important role for foundations’ philanthropy.  Under this framework, 
the foundations continue to provide grants to the public interest 
organizations, just as the Rosenberg Foundation did in Dukes.293  
However, these grants will now act as subsidies to the impact 
investors, high net-worth individuals, and traditional investors who 
provide capital to the litigation financing firm and expect both a 
social and monetary return on their investment.294  In other words, 
                                                          
 290. Id. § 4.04.  However, in situations where a client does have a “sufficient 
financial interest” to justify private representation, the public interest organization 
may “in cases of sufficient broad public interest, represent the public interest as 
amicus curiae or intervenor.” Id.  
 291. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2014) (requiring “a public benefit 
corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary 
interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, 
and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation”). 
 292. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 1 (stating that “[t]hese guidelines are 
not inflexible and an organization will be given the opportunity to demonstrate that 
under the facts and circumstances of its particular program, adherence to the 
guidelines is not required in certain respects in order to ensure that the operations 
are totally charitable”). 
 293. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text (explaining that Rosenberg’s 
support of the impact litigation effort included grants and a program-related 
investment to the public interest organization bringing the case); see also supra notes 
93–94 and accompanying text (noting that most of public interest organizations’ 
current support comes from foundations’ grants and other philanthropic efforts).  
 294. See Bugg-Levine et al., supra note 228, at 4 (providing a social enterprise 
model that seeks to attract investment from investors to organizations with a social 
purpose).  Importantly, Bugg-Levine et al. advocate a model of financing social 
enterprise that specifically carves out a continued role for foundations: 
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the foundations’ grants make it “worth it” for conventional investors.  
Likewise, a litigation financing firm could follow a similar contractual 
arrangement as the one advocated for by Professor Steinitz in the for-
profit industry:  the litigation financing firm serves as a general 
corporate partner that manages funds in a limited partnership with 
passive investors, earning a small fee for assembling the capital and 
entering into litigation finance contracts on behalf of the fund.295  
However, in the social enterprise model, the general partner is a 
litigation financing firm organized as a benefit corporation with an 
expertise in financing public interest litigation, and the limited 
partners would not only be traditional investors looking to make a 
monetary return but also impact investors seeking a social return on a 
specific case or portfolio of cases.296  This arrangement is illustrated 
in Diagram B in the Appendix. 
                                                          
The donor [such as a foundation] does not expect to get its money back; 
it expects its money to generate a social benefit.  It considers the 
investment a failure only if that social benefit is not created.  . . . [W]ith 
a donor-investor willing to subsidize half the cost, the social enterprise 
becomes valuable and less risky to conventional investors.  The 
traditional model of social enterprise leaves this value on the table.  
Donors lose out because they fully subsidize a project that could have 
attracted investment capital, and investors do not participate at all.  . . . 
In the emerging model of social enterprise capital markets, donors play 
the role of equity holders, providing capital that supports an enterprise 
and that makes the debt taken on by financial investors safer, with 
better expected returns. 
Id. at 5.  This model of social enterprise can be adopted to litigation finance to 
similarly ensure higher returns for traditional investors, many of whom are becoming 
increasingly interested in litigation finance due to the potential for extraordinarily 
high returns.  See Alden, supra note 129 (explaining that a new litigation financing 
firm has raised capital “from investors like public pension funds, university 
endowments and family offices”).  Public interest litigation may not offer as high a 
return to these investors as commercial cases.  However, if the foundations continue 
to provide donations to fund public interest litigation (as they currently do), then 
they effectively subsidize the investment for traditional investors and ensure a higher 
return than would otherwise be the case; this, in turn, broadens the pool of capital 
available to the public interest organization in much the same way as discussed by 
Bugg-Levine et al.  
 295. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text (summarizing Professor 
Steinitz’s litigation finance arrangement modeled after venture capital firms).  
 296. This sets up two levels of capital derived from potential investors in the firm, 
which strongly contrasts with the non-profit form’s inability to make distributions to 
investors.  See supra note 115 (explaining restrictions on non-profits).  Essentially, 
those who are interested in the litigation financing firm for its potential to finance 
public interest litigation could be the shareholders in the firm (and most likely the 
directors and officers).  The “second level” of investment would then be in the form 
of the limited partnership arrangements advocated for by Professor Steinitz.  See 
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Employing this social enterprise model resolves a number of the 
disadvantages present in the non-profit and for-profit models of 
financing public interest organizations and their litigation efforts.  As 
laid out in Part II.B, the for-profit model has provided little financing 
assistance to public interest organizations as it is strictly motivated by 
profit-maximization; it has little to gain from generating social 
returns for its investors.297  Meanwhile, the non-profit donor model of 
funding public interest litigation is strictly regulated, limited in 
available capital, and without the expertise and devoted interest in 
funding public interest cases.298  The social enterprise model attempts 
to resolve these issues by providing a middle ground that moderates 
the for-profit model’s shareholder maximization norm while 
preserving the non-profit model’s goal of achieving a social benefit. 
More particularly, a director of a benefit corporation, under both 
the Model Legislation and the Delaware PBC, is mandated (and 
empowered) to consider the effect of his decisions on not only 
shareholders, but also on customers and beneficiaries of the benefit 
corporation’s stated general and specific benefits.299  For this reason, 
a director of a litigation financing firm organized as a benefit 
corporation would not be required to strictly adhere to the profit-
maximization norm that pervades the for-profit litigation finance 
industry.300  Instead, the director would be free to consider the 
ramifications of the corporation’s actions on the beneficiaries of its 
financing—the public interest organizations and the individual 
claimholders—as well as the broader potential for social impact.301  
This also ensures that the litigation financing firm’s incentives better 
                                                          
supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text (discussing a limited-partnership 
arrangement to be used by for-profit firms).  
 297. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (explaining the access-to-
justice and private enforcement rationale for litigation finance but how the industry 
has come up short by providing financing only to sophisticated parties).  
 298. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of the 
non-profit model of financing public interest litigation). 
 299. See supra notes 251, 274 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text 
that lessens the obligation on directors to solely consider shareholder value). 
 300. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text (discussing how for-profit 
litigation financing firms are incentivized to maximize profits for investors).  
 301. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining how the benefit 
corporation provisions may be used by a director to defend himself in a derivative 
suit challenging his decisions). 
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align with the plaintiffs and the public interest organization than in 
the for-profit context.302 
The social enterprise model also offers unique advantages over the 
non-profit donor model of financing cases.  First, the benefit 
corporation is not organized as a non-profit, so shareholders would 
be free to receive distributions and partake in the equity growth of 
the organization.303  As a result, the enterprise is open to funding 
from the impact investment community and further serves to expand 
the potential pool of capital for financing a public interest 
organization’s litigation efforts.304  Second, the benefit corporation 
would be free to make an investment in the litigation in much the 
same fashion as the Rosenberg Foundation did in Dukes, but without 
the burden of satisfying the onerous program-related investment 
rules.305  Lastly, the benefit corporation, due to its specific benefit, 
will be uniquely focused on providing funding for public interest 
litigation, allowing it to build up a reputation as a specialized firm in 
this area.306  Consequently, the benefit corporation would have a 
tremendous advantage over foundations that often do not have the 
                                                          
 302. See infra Part IV.C.1 (contending that a benefit corporation’s dual mandate to 
consider profits and social benefit is more compatible with balancing the interests of 
investors and its funded plaintiffs). 
 303. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the 
distribution restrictions placed on non-profits that prohibit equity investment and 
require all earnings remain in the non-profit).  
 304. See supra notes 225–28 and accompanying text (noting the growing 
community of impact investors who primarily seek a social return on their 
investment, as well as the traditional investors who, as a secondary consideration, are 
increasingly looking for socially beneficial investments). 
 305. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text (reviewing the laws governing 
program-related investments by foundations and the difficulty in ensuring such 
investments do not run afoul of the IRS’s guidance).  
 306. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 498–99 (arguing that 
the law should facilitate a litigation financing firm’s “noncash contributions” that 
lessen the risk inherent in litigation finance).  Further, Professor Steinitz argues that 
the firm’s principals, many of which will be lawyers, may exercise their expertise in 
making investment decisions into certain cases for traditional investors who are 
unfamiliar with the nuances of litigation.  Id.  In the public interest context, we can 
imagine a litigation financing firm providing ample “noncash contributions” to the 
public interest organization, especially when considering that impact litigation 
efforts often have to be coordinated with broader legislative efforts and public 
relation campaigns.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that public 
interest law is no longer focused strictly on litigation).  Additionally, the firm may be 
able to channel connections to foundations, thereby lessening the burden and 
expense that foundations currently accrue in maintaining these valuable 
relationships.  This would offer a competitive advantage over current for-profit 
financing firms.  
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expertise, focus, or desire for the nuances of investing in an impact 
litigation effort.307 
Finally, this model also addresses an issue that was laid out in the 
very beginning of this Comment:  public interest organizations often 
represent plaintiffs exercising a private right of action, but if they fail 
to become a “prevailing party” because of a voluntary change in 
conduct by the defendant, they do not earn an award of attorneys’ 
fees.308  Here, however, the litigation financing firm would advance 
the costs of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff who then uses those funds 
to engage the public interest organization’s representation,309 
lessening the “chilling effect” that Buckhannon had on public interest 
litigation as a whole.310  In other words, establishing a litigation financing 
firm in the public interest field may have the potential to support not 
only access to justice but also private enforcement of the law. 
B. The Advantages of the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation 
As detailed in Part III, Delaware authorizes the incorporation of 
public benefit corporations that closely follow the business form 
established in B Lab’s Model Legislation.311  However, the Delaware 
PBC statute and Delaware corporate law provides a number of crucial 
advantages over the Model Legislation for a litigation financing firm 
funding public interest litigation.312 
1. The specific benefit as an enforcement mechanism 
As a Delaware PBC, the litigation financing firm would be required 
to provide a specific public benefit in its certificate of 
incorporation,313 as opposed to merely the tenuous and broadly 
                                                          
 307. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text (discussing survey findings 
indicating that foundations prefer other philanthropic efforts over litigation and lack 
the expertise and patience necessary to fund controversial cases). 
 308. See supra Part I.C (explaining the ramifications of the Buckhannon ruling). 
 309. See supra note 81 (providing an example of the impact that Buckhannon had 
on a public interest organization’s ability to recoup fees after expending 
considerable time and effort in a case).  
 310. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (noting that public interest 
organizations reported negative impacts after the Supreme Court’s Buckhannon decision).   
 311. See supra notes 240–41 and accompanying text (stating that the various state 
laws are based on the benefit corporation model promulgated by B Lab, a non-profit 
devoted to encouraging adoption of the benefit corporation form). 
 312. See supra Part III.B (outlining the benefits of the Delaware public benefit 
corporation statute over the Model Legislation). 
 313. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text that 
mandates use of a specific benefit within the contours of certain parameters).  
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defined general benefit found in the Model Legislation.314  Given that 
the envisioned entity must attract investment from the impact 
investor and the traditional investment community, delineating a 
specific benefit establishes agreement between the firm and its 
shareholders or investors that the firm will finance public interest 
litigation.315  Alternatively, if the litigation financing firm organized as 
a benefit corporation under the Model Legislation, it would be 
required only to set out a  “general benefit” that provides little 
reassurance to investors and shareholders that the corporation will 
pursue its social purpose of financing public interest litigation.316 
The requirement that the corporation follow a specific benefit also 
provides greater enforceability of the benefit corporation’s purpose 
to invest in public interest litigation.  Importantly, the Delaware Law 
allows for a derivative suit against directors who fail to balance “the 
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct [with] the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in 
its certificate of incorporation.”317  In this context, a shareholder of 
the litigation financing firm would have grounds to argue that 
directors who pursue cases wholly outside of the public interest area 
have not balanced the shareholders’ interests with the specific public 
benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation.318  Injunctive 
relief could then follow.319  A more likely scenario may arise when the 
benefit corporation funds a case that offers a lesser return to its 
shareholders and investors but a greater benefit to the public interest 
organization and the plaintiff; for example, a case may settle for non-
monetary relief instead of a large monetary award.  Likewise, the 
directors may decide not to issue a dividend on earnings but instead 
fund cases that are less profitable but more impactful.  In those type 
of situations, the directors may defend their decision-making by 
arguing that under the Delaware PBC statute they are not required 
                                                          
 314. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (stating the broad statutory text of 
the Model Code defining a “public benefit”).   
 315. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (explaining that the required 
specific benefit provides greater specificity for shareholders looking to enforce 
the social purpose). 
 316. See supra notes 246, 249 and accompanying text (noting while a benefit 
corporation is obligated to embrace the general benefit that it will act in a 
responsible manner, any specific benefits are optional).  
 317. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 318. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (finding that the provisions of the 
Delaware PBC provide greater specificity for shareholders to enforce the social mission). 
 319. Cf. supra note 252 (noting that the language of the Model Legislation limits 
the liability of directors to injunctive relief). 
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to solely consider the shareholder’s monetary interests but may also 
take into account the interests of the plaintiffs funded by the 
benefit corporation.320 
Likewise, if the directors fail to issue the required benefit report 
indicating how the corporation is fulfilling its purpose to invest in 
public interest litigation,321 the shareholders could file a derivative 
suit to force the directors to produce such a report.322  In sum, the 
statutory requirement that a Delaware PBC embrace specific benefit 
provides greater accountability, as well as a degree of freedom for 
directors in financing public interest litigation. 
2. Signaling 
The Delaware PBC, unlike the Model Legislation, requires the 
corporation to affix the acronym “PBC” in its name and to state that 
it is incorporated as a PBC in any stock certificates or notices.323  By 
attaching the PBC acronym to its title, the litigation financing firm 
would signal to public interest organizations that the entity has a 
social purpose.  Furthermore, by affixing a notice to stock certificates, 
traditional investors are on notice that the corporation is not strictly 
following the shareholder maximization norm.  Likewise, impact 
investors are drawn to the investment because it indicates that the 
litigation financing firm seeks social, as well as monetary benefits. 
3. Optional third-party assessment 
Another advantage in organizing the litigation financing firm as a 
Delaware PBC would be avoidance of any third-party assessment.  As 
discussed above, the Model Legislation requires benefit corporations 
to embrace a third-party standard that verifies whether a public 
benefit is being pursued.324  Such a requirement would be particularly 
                                                          
 320. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining that, like the Model 
Legislation, the Delaware PBC allows a director to exercise duties more freely by 
considering factors outside of shareholder value).  
 321. See supra note 270 (providing the statutory text of the Delaware PBC 
requiring the board of directors provide a detailed statement on how the corporation 
promotes the public benefit identified in its certificate of incorporation). 
 322. See supra note 260 (discussing how, in the context of the Model Legislation, a 
benefit report places informal constraints on directors to follow the social mission of 
the benefit corporation).  Much of the same would apply to the Delaware PBC, with 
the added benefit of greater specificity. 
 323. See supra notes 271–72 (providing the statutory text).  
 324. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text (providing statutory text that 
obligates a benefit corporation under the Model Legislation to assess any public 
benefit against a third-party standard). 
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onerous for a litigation financing firm because it may obtain vital 
information about ongoing litigation in its due diligence process as it 
oversees additional funding for the case.325  Current case law suggests 
that a plaintiff’s disclosure of such information to a litigation 
financing firm could constitute a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege if there is no “common interest” between the third-party 
financing firm and the plaintiff.326  Undoubtedly, a litigation 
financing firm may receive a number of sensitive documents, ranging 
from the attorney’s thoughts on a case’s prospect for success to 
discussion with the plaintiff on a strategy for settlement talks.327  If an 
industry watchdog disclosed such information through third-party 
assessment in an effort to verify that the benefit corporation is 
fulfilling its social purpose, the disclosure could constitute a waiver of 
attorney-client privilege and surely jeopardize a later finding that the 
funder and the plaintiff are within a “common interest.”328  The 
Delaware statute, however, avoids this problem entirely by not 
requiring third-party assessment of the benefit corporation unless the 
certificate of incorporation opts into such a requirement.329  As such, 
public interest organizations could rest assured that any information 
in the due diligence process would not be provided to any third parties. 
4. The benefit report is not public 
Under the Model Legislation and Delaware PBC statute, a benefit 
corporation must prepare a benefit report for shareholders 
                                                          
 325. See supra notes 136, 212 (elaborating on the due diligence process and 
information shared between the litigation financing firm, attorney, and client 
before financing).  
 326. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (explaining that preserving 
attorney-client privilege when attorneys share confidential information with 
financing firms may lie in the “common-interest exception”). 
 327. See, e.g., supra note 136 (explaining the due diligence process Burford 
Capital undertakes before investing in a case and what types of documents may be 
disclosed to the firm). 
 328. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (explaining the inconsistent 
application of the “common-interest exception” to the litigation financing 
arrangement for purposes of the attorney-client privilege).  Plausibly, if the firm is a 
benefit corporation with the stated purpose to fund the plaintiff’s case for its non-
monetary and monetary benefits, there is a decent argument that the litigation 
financing firm is in more of a “common interest” with the plaintiff than would 
otherwise be the case in the for-profit litigation finance industry.  
 329. See supra notes 268–69 (discussing how the Delaware PBC statute eliminates 
the obligation under the Model Legislation to adopt a third-party standard in 
assessing the benefit corporation’s public benefit after considerable criticism).  
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indicating how it fulfills its social mission.330  In the litigation finance 
context, such a benefit report may include attorney work product—
the attorney’s analysis of a given case, the prospect for success, a draft 
of an important brief, or even the strategy for settling with the 
defendant.331  In fact, given the extensive requirements of the benefit 
report, some attorney work product by the public interest 
organization may have to be included in this report to adequately 
ensure shareholders that the public benefits are being promoted and 
an adequate resolution to the controversy is being sought.332  Yet, if 
this information were ever provided to the general public, waiver of 
the attorney work product doctrine would be clear.333  Under the 
Delaware PBC statute, however, directors of the corporation are 
obligated to provide the benefit report only to shareholders of the 
corporation and not the general public.334  This is an important 
advantage.  A public interest organization’s attorneys would be free to 
provide attorney work product to the financing firm’s directors, who 
could then include some of that information in their benefit report 
to the shareholders.335  As discussed previously, the protection of the 
                                                          
 330. See supra notes 261–62 and accompanying text (stating that the benefit 
corporation must provide a benefit report).  
 331. See supra note 210 (indicating what types of materials may constitute attorney 
work product).  For example, in the Chevron litigation, an attorney brought in by the 
litigation financing firm prepared a memo detailing the best strategy for enforcing 
the judgment against the company or otherwise acquiring an adequate settlement.  
See Mufson, supra note 176 (noting that attorneys prepared a confidential, so-called 
“Invictus” memo outlining strategy for enforcing the judgment against Chevron).  
 332. See supra note 270 (providing the statutory requirements for the benefit 
report under the Delaware PBC statute).  Notably, the Delaware PBC statutory text 
requires directors to include “objective factual information” on how the firm is 
pursuing its goal of social impact and financing public interest organizations.  This 
would, at the very least, include the names of current cases in which the firm is 
invested (which is currently kept confidential by for-profit firms).  Likewise, it also 
requires an “assessment” of the corporation’s success in meeting its social objectives, 
which would plausibly include the type of relief obtained in a litigation effort.  If the 
officers failed to provide this, then the shareholders and investors could bring a suit 
to obtain such information.  
 333. See supra note 211 (explaining that to ensure non-waiver of the attorney work 
product doctrine, precautions must be taken that prevent the litigant’s adversaries 
from obtaining the sensitive information).  
 334. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (stating that under the Delaware 
PBC statute the public benefit report only has to be provided to shareholders).  
 335. A public interest organization may not want to share any attorney-work 
product with a litigation financing firm given the risk, but due to the obligation of 
the financing firm to identify and consider the non-monetary benefits of its 
operations, it is likely that some information from a public interest organization’s 
lawyers on their cases will have to be shared.  Nevertheless, lawyers for the litigant 
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attorney work product doctrine would extend to this information so 
long as the director obtains a nondisclosure agreement from the 
shareholders336—a seemingly simple task because the Delaware PBC 
does not require that the information be made publicly available.  
In turn, this facilitates information flow between shareholders, 
directors, and the public interest organization regarding the social 
impact of the litigation. 
5. Delaware law treatment of general corporate partners 
Delaware’s corporate law also has the advantage of providing 
flexibility in modifying the duties owed in a typical limited 
partnership agreement.  As discussed above, the envisioned entity 
could follow much of the same path advocated for in the for-profit 
industry by Professor Steinitz:  the litigation financing firm acts as the 
corporate general partner that manages the pooled assets of investors 
in a limited partnership agreement,337 with the investors serving as 
limited partners in the fund.338  But this arrangement raises its own 
issues about what duties are owed to the limited partners by the 
general partner.  In Delaware, the default rule is that a general 
partner owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners.339  Moreover, if 
the general partner is a corporation, then that corporation’s directors 
also owe fiduciary duties to the limited partners.340  For this reason, it 
is likely that under Professor Steinitz’s framework, the directors of a 
litigation financing firm acting as a corporate general partner owe 
fiduciary duties to the investors serving as limited partners in the fund. 
The social enterprise model, however, differs in one fundamental 
respect:  the litigation financing firm serving as a corporate general 
partner in the limited partnership would be organized as a benefit 
                                                          
and directors of the firm should be selective in the amount of detail they include in 
such reports, with the overall goal being to apprise investors of the social impact of 
their investment while also not disclosing important strategy and factual information 
relevant to ongoing litigation.   
 336. See supra notes 202, 216 and accompanying text (discussing case law that 
indicates protection of the attorney work product doctrine will not be waived when 
the lawyer obtains a nondisclosure agreement from the recipient).  
 337. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text (providing a short overview of 
the limited partnership arrangement advocated for in the for-profit context).  
 338. Supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
 339. See generally Winnifred A. Lewis, Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1029 (2013) 
(providing an overview of Delaware corporate law regarding fiduciary duties in 
limited partnerships). 
 340. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. 1991) (imposing 
fiduciary duties on directors of a corporate general partner to its limited partners).  
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corporation.  As discussed in Part III, the benefit corporation’s 
directors have a modified fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the 
corporation that allows the directors to consider factors outside of 
the shareholder maximization norm.341  What duty, then, does the 
benefit corporation owe to the limited partners if it follows Professor 
Steinitz’s framework?  Arguably, if the broad language of the benefit 
corporation statute modifies the duties owed by its directors to 
shareholders, then it also modifies the duties owed by those directors to 
its limited partners.342  This conclusion finds additional textual support 
in the Delaware PBC statute.343 
This default rule344 has an advantage over the current for-profit 
litigation financing arrangement as it provides more flexibility 
depending on the type of investor.  Notably, the limited partner 
investors who want to realize a social impact on their investments (for 
example, impact investors) would have some recourse against the 
litigation financing firm’s directors if they were to wholly fail to 
balance the specific benefit and profit goals of the fund or shirk any 
                                                          
 341. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing how the benefit 
corporation statute modifies the director’s duties to shareholders by requiring that 
the directors balance the financial interests of the stockholders and the public 
benefit as described in its certificate of incorporation).  
 342. This modification, however, is an entirely new legal question.  What fiduciary 
duties does a benefit corporation acting as a corporate general partner in a limited 
partnership owe to its limited partners?  No case law exists on this question, as the 
benefit corporation is a very recent invention.  The Delaware Code, however, is 
phrased broadly enough to impose a positive duty on directors to balance the 
shareholder’s interests with the interests of those benefiting from the public benefit 
in this situation.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013) (requiring that directors 
“shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a 
manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of 
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit 
or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation” (emphasis added)). 
 343. See id. § 361 (providing that “[i]f a corporation elects to become a public 
benefit corporation . . . , it shall be subject in all respects to the provisions of 
[Delaware’s general corporation law] chapter, except to the extent this subchapter 
imposes additional or different requirements, in which case such requirements shall 
apply” (emphasis added)).  Given this provision, the statute’s language in section 
365(a) modifies the duties owed by directors in a benefit corporation. 
 344. Delaware allows the fiduciary duties owed by general partners to be modified 
or eliminated entirely.  See Lewis, supra note 339, at 1029 (explaining the 
modifications and elimination of fiduciary duties under Delaware Law).  If the 
default rule, however, is that the fiduciary duties of the benefit corporation’s 
directors include an obligation to balance the competing interests of shareholders 
and other stakeholders, then impact investors should feel comfortable that they have 
some recourse if the firm decides to not follow its social mission to finance public 
interest litigation.  
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obligation to public interest organizations or the plaintiffs.  
Conversely, if the limited partner investors were more profit oriented 
with a social benefit only as a secondary consideration (for example, 
traditional investors), the litigation finance firm could assert that the 
director is free to balance the interests of the limited partners with 
the public interest organization that it funds.  Either way, the 
directors gain some freedom to make a decision on behalf of the 
limited partnership fund that balances the public interest 
organization’s interests, while also ensuring that traditional investors, 
high net-worth individuals, and impact investors remain passive in the 
management of the fund.345 
C. The Public Policy Benefits 
Organizing a litigation financing firm as a benefit corporation 
generates a number of public policy benefits for the litigation finance 
industry and the plaintiffs who receive financing.  As explored in Part 
II.B, the growth of the litigation finance industry in recent years is 
justified by its potential to provide greater access to justice and 
promote the private enforcement of the law, but it currently falls 
short of achieving these goals.346  In particular, this Comment argues 
that the industry’s failings in this regard are in large part due to:  (1) 
the exclusion of public interest organizations from the litigation 
financing firm’s portfolio and (2) the regulatory uncertainty inherent 
in the champerty doctrine.347  By establishing a litigation financing 
firm as a social enterprise, both of these issues are addressed.  First, 
the social enterprise model more effectively aligns incentives between 
the investors in the litigation and the plaintiffs than the for-profit 
model.  Second, it leads to stronger regulation of the relationship 
                                                          
 345. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 500 (stating that the 
limited partnership structure “isolate[s] investors from their cases, avoiding potential 
conflicts with defendants”).  It may also create a “wall” between investors and the 
litigation financing firm that protects any confidential information shared with the 
firm by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s lawyer.  See id. at 503.  In our context, this may 
be particularly important given that the parties may enter with good intentions to 
pursue a social cause, but then grow wary of their investment as the time and 
resources required in a litigation becomes more apparent. 
 346. See generally supra notes 151–52 (discussing the proponents’ arguments for 
allowing less restricted forms of litigation financing and limiting application of the 
champerty doctrine). 
 347. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (detailing how public interest organizations cannot tap 
into for-profit litigation financing to fund their cases, and the uneven application of 
the champerty, attorney-work product doctrine, and attorney-client privilege to the 
litigation finance contract).  
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between the funder, investors, and the plaintiff than the champerty 
doctrine, while also protecting against possible abuse.  These 
arguments are detailed below. 
1. Realigning incentives between funder and plaintiff 
The exclusion of public interest organizations is primarily a 
product of misaligned incentives facing the litigation financing firm, 
as manager of an investment, and the public interest organization, as 
attorney for the plaintiff.348  However, in the social enterprise model 
outlined above, the incentives are much better aligned between the 
funder (the benefit corporation), its own investors and shareholders 
(the impact investors, high net worth individuals, and traditional 
investors), the legal representation (the public interest organization) 
and the eventual plaintiff who receives the funds to pursue the case 
(the claimholder).  Broadly speaking, all parties involved understand 
that the goal of the litigation financing firm, as explicitly stated in its 
certificate of incorporation, is enforcing a legal right for its potential 
non-monetary and monetary relief.349  In other words, the model 
moderates the for-profit drive so characteristic of the current 
litigation finance industry by adopting a business form and 
investment strategy that emphasizes goals much more aligned with 
public interest organizations and their clients. 
More particularly, organizing the litigation financing firm as a 
benefit corporation aligns the incentives of the firm with the public 
interest organization’s pursuit of non-monetary relief.  Typically, for-
profit litigation financing firms attempt to maximize profits and 
“commodify” legal claims.350  However, when the litigation financing 
firm is organized as a benefit corporation, the firm would become 
uniquely interested in the non-monetary relief to be gained from 
public interest litigation.  For instance, the benefit corporation, in 
pursuit of generating a “social benefit,” may now support a public 
interest organization that seeks remedial relief resulting in an 
injunction against the defendant.  A change in the law or agency 
                                                          
 348. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing how public interest organizations bring 
impact cases that emphasize injunctive relief, while for-profit litigation financing 
firms pursue commercial cases that emphasize high monetary returns).  
 349. See supra note 280 (providing a hypothetical specific benefit to be included in 
the litigation finance firm’s articles of incorporation as required under the 
Delaware PBC statute). 
 350. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1321 (discussing that some may 
oppose litigation finance because of the possibility for “reduction of legal claims, 
particularly of nonbusiness legal claims, into a mere commodity”). 
WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  8:10 PM 
2014] LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 449 
policy may also be valuable to the organization.351  For the benefit 
corporation, these remedies could constitute a “public benefit,” 
which it could then promote in its benefit report to shareholders and 
in advertising to other public interest organizations.352  From this, the 
litigation financing firm gains a reputation among public interest 
organizations, while also apprising other potential impact investors of 
how litigation finance can bring about meaningful social change.353 
Additionally, these realigned incentives could result in altering the 
contractual arrangements between the parties; for instance, the 
definition of “award” in the contracts between the litigation financing 
firm and the plaintiff may change.354  As discussed above, even when 
for-profit litigation financing firms fund public interest litigation 
because of a large possible monetary return, the contract may require 
that the value of any non-monetary relief be taken out of the plaintiff’s 
share of the overall award.355  In fact, the contract in the Chevron 
litigation explicitly included the non-monetary relief in the definition 
of “award,” and stated that any “[d]isputes regarding noncash award 
value are to be resolved by a single arbitrator, who is an accounting or 
valuation expert, in an expedited process.”356  This, in effect, 
increased the total amount of litigation proceeds earned by the 
plaintiff from which the funder took a 20 to 30% share.357  Yet, if the 
litigation-financing firm is a benefit corporation looking to generate 
a social benefit in addition to a monetary return, it has a direct 
                                                          
 351. See supra notes 158–60 (describing how public interest organizations often do 
not pursue profit but injunctive and symbolic relief). 
 352. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (explaining that the Delaware 
PBC, in an effort to create transparency, requires a director to distribute a public 
benefit report to shareholders).  
 353. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 518 (arguing, in the 
for-profit context, that “regulators and lawmakers, including judges, should consider 
the critical role of reputation markets which, in turn, rely on the transparency of the 
industry”).  In this context, the litigation financing firm would have a direct incentive 
to be transparent in its investments because it garners “reputational capital” from the 
work it is doing.  
 354. The financing firm could provide for a fiduciary duty in its contract with the 
plaintiff because such an obligation is much less of a direct conflict for directors 
under the benefit corporation form.  See infra notes 370–75 and accompanying text 
(discussing the fiduciary duty as a better form of self-regulation).  
 355. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text (discussing the contract in the 
Chevron litigation). 
 356. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 478. 
 357. See Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 154, at 740 
n.120 (explaining that “Burford’s investment in the Chevron–Ecuador dispute . . . 
penalized plaintiffs for receiving clean-ups rather than funds by requiring them to 
pay the funder for its pro-rated share of such a remedy”). 
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incentive to exclude the value of any non-monetary relief from the 
contract’s definition of “award.”  In this fashion, when the litigation 
financing firm provides funding, it would support not only a 
monetary recovery but also the social benefit obtained through 
non-monetary relief. 
The public interest organization’s incentives are also better aligned 
with those of its funders because the financing firm would be less 
likely to try to compromise the organization’s attorney-client 
relationships with its clients.  As previously discussed, current 
litigation financing firms may seek to control litigation to earn a 
better return for its shareholders; mainly, they may pressure the 
attorney to settle early for a monetary sum or try to bring in an 
attorney that is more hospitable to the firm’s objectives.358  Yet, when 
the litigation financing firm’s explicit purpose is to support public 
interest organizations’ legal efforts and broadly pursue a social 
benefit, the benefit corporation has a strong incentive to partner with 
attorneys who are more interested in the broad, social impact the 
litigation hopes to achieve than the monetary relief that may occur.359  
Furthermore, as discussed above, the benefit corporation’s interests 
in non-monetary and monetary relief better align with a plaintiff’s 
often mixed and “bundled interests” in claims that offer various levels 
of relief.360  This incentive, in turn, goes a long way towards ensuring 
that the firm does not also pressure the public interest organization 
to settle early and earn a quick return.361  Alternatively, the benefit 
corporation may be more willing to support the litigant who forgoes 
an early settlement offer in favor of going to court for an injunction 
or symbolic victory.362  Either way, the benefit corporation is less 
obligated to the shareholder maximization norm than its for-profit 
alternative, resulting in less pressure on the attorney’s ability to 
provide candid and objective advice to his client. 
                                                          
 358. See supra notes 162–64 (explaining that a litigation financing firm may try to 
control litigation by choosing an attorney or obtaining power over whether to settle a case). 
 359. See supra note 68 (describing how public interest organizations now situate 
litigation efforts in their broader social campaigns). 
 360. Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1322. 
 361. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (stating that litigation financing 
firms have an incentive to pressure attorneys to settle a case early for monetary value 
while a public interest organization will often want to pursue a case for its monetary 
and non-monetary relief).  
 362. See supra note 170–171 and accompanying text (noting that litigation financing 
may embolden litigants to pursue trial remedies and resist monetary settlement). 
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2. Promoting a better regulatory regime for litigation finance 
Organizing a litigation financing firm as a benefit corporation may 
also mean that the entity fares better than a strictly for-profit 
litigation financing firm under the uncertain champerty doctrine.  In 
Massachusetts and other states, the champerty doctrine has been 
abandoned and other doctrines govern litigation-finance 
agreements.363  In these states, the for-profit and benefit 
corporation’s contracts with plaintiffs would likely be enforceable, 
though it is possible that a benefit corporation’s contract would, on 
its face, appear less unconscionable.  In other states, however, the 
doctrine is not abandoned but rather moderated to prohibit 
litigation financing when it promotes unmeritorious claims or results 
in a funder exercising control over or “intermeddling” with 
litigation.364  The social enterprise model, as discussed above, realigns 
incentives so that litigation financing firms have less incentive to 
control litigation for its purely monetary benefits;365 as such, any 
exerted pressure or control on the plaintiff’s attorney becomes much 
less likely.  Most importantly, the benefit corporation’s effort to fund 
public interest litigation would fit squarely within the exception to 
New York’s champerty doctrine, which refuses to enforce an 
agreement that has “the sole purpose of initiating litigation where no 
prior right to the underlying claim exists.”366  The benefit 
corporation’s specific benefit requires the corporation to enter into 
cases already filed by public interest organizations, ensuring that a 
prior right to the underlying claim exits.367 
As commentators advocate rolling back champerty to promote 
growth in litigation finance, some have proposed that the doctrine 
continue to prohibit funding in some types of cases but otherwise 
allow litigation finance to flourish in the commercial context.368  
                                                          
 363. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (stating that Massachusetts has 
completely abandoned the champerty doctrine and opted for using other doctrines 
to control the issues that may be raised by litigation finance, such as 
unconscionability and frivolous litigation).  
 364. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (summarizing how champerty is 
applied in states that retain the doctrine).  
 365. See supra Part IV.C.1 (detailing how a litigation financing firm opting for the 
benefit corporation form would have different incentives than a for-profit litigation 
finance firm).  
 366. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 154, at 727. 
 367. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (providing the specific benefit 
language that a litigation financing firm organized as a benefit corporation may adopt). 
 368. See Sebok, supra note 206, at 108 (contending that “[l]imiting profit 
maintenance on the basis of what kind of suit the maintenance supports would seem 
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However, if litigation financing is strictly prohibited in certain cases, 
such as class actions or public interest litigation, that would seem to 
cut against the original reason the practice was allowed in the first 
place:  access to justice.369  Thus, it may be advisable that instead 
policymakers mandate that certain cases (for instance, those based on 
a private right of action or class action) be restricted in accepting 
financing from a litigation financing firm organized as a benefit 
corporation.  This would ensure that the litigants who need litigation 
financing the most receive the benefit of a litigation financing 
industry, while also avoiding the more negative consequences 
discussed above. 
Ultimately, opting for the social enterprise model may also 
indirectly lead to better self-regulation by litigation financing firms in 
their contracts with plaintiffs.  As it now stands, a for-profit litigation 
financing firm that owes a fiduciary duty to a plaintiff would be in 
direct conflict with the firm’s obligations to shareholders and 
investors to earn a profitable return.370  It is not surprising, then, that 
for-profit litigation financing firms do not impose such a duty on 
themselves in their contracts with plaintiffs.371  The benefit 
corporation statute, however, modifies a director’s duties to allow 
consideration of factors outside of shareholder value;372 in fact, a 
director in a benefit corporation has an obligation to balance the 
                                                          
to be an obvious means of regulation for a state that wanted to support champerty as 
a matter of general principle while recognizing that, as a matter of public policy, 
there might be some types of litigation which are ill-suited to third-party 
investment”); see also Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1321–22 (arguing that 
“[l]egislatures and courts should decide which litigation subject matters should, as a 
matter of public policy, be subject to commodification and which should not”). 
 369. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text (asserting that proponents of 
litigation finance point to increased access to justice for disadvantaged parties and 
greater private enforcement of the law as potential benefits of a less restricting 
regulatory regime).  
 370. See supra note 184 (stating that in the litigation financing context, a fiduciary 
duty would moderate a number of the issues impacting the relationship between the 
litigation financing firm and the plaintiffs but its effectiveness would conflict with the 
firm’s obligations to maximize value for shareholders).  
 371. See Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 740 
(discussing how “[t]o date, no such regulation has been imposed [by courts or 
legislatures], leaving it up to the private ordering of the parties.  Because of the 
fiduciary duty’s potency, a funder may simply refuse its imposition through contract”); 
see also supra note 183 (providing the statutory text of the contract in Burford’s 
investment in the Chevron litigation that explicitly disclaimed any fiduciary duties). 
 372. See supra notes 268–76 and accompanying text (discussing the legal argument 
that a director could make when faced with challenges to his business decision).  
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interests of those who stand to gain from the stated benefit.373  In this 
way, the benefit corporation statute serves to moderate the litigation 
finance firm’s duty to maximize profits for its investors, which in turn 
makes establishing a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs much less of a direct 
conflict.374  Provided with this flexibility, the directors may well 
establish fiduciary duties with their funded plaintiffs that would 
otherwise not be provided in the for-profit context, thereby curtailing 
many of the same practices that the overly restrictive champerty 
doctrine prohibits.375 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment began with an alarming statistic on the scarcity of 
public interest lawyers and the overwhelming demand for their 
services.  Moreover, it posited that public interest organizations and 
their litigation efforts play a crucial role in the United States’ private 
enforcement regime.  Yet despite all of this, a seemingly inapposite 
trend is apparent:  these organizations are dramatically underfunded.  
Further, when the same organizations turn to third parties to help 
fund their litigation efforts, be it a non-profit donor or a for-profit 
litigation financing firm, the funding is either too limited or comes 
with strings attached:  the foundations and non-profits can only offer 
a limited amount of resources and expertise in financing public 
interest litigation, while the for-profit litigation financing firms either 
exert associated pressures on plaintiffs and their counsel, or abstain 
from financing public interest litigation altogether.  Somewhat 
ironically, the litigation finance sector continues to claim it 
champions the very two things that public interest law seeks to 
                                                          
 373. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text of the 
Delaware PBC statute and discussing the possibility that its language may require 
more of directors than under the Model Legislation).   
 374. Likewise, the benefit corporation statute states that the certificate of 
incorporation may state that any failure to satisfy the balance requirements of the 
statute will not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith.  See supra note 
273 (providing statutory text).  Opting into this provision would similarly make any 
fiduciary duty to a plaintiff much less of a conflict. 
 375. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1328–29 (arguing that a fiduciary 
duty is the best way to ensure the litigation financing firm does not attempt to 
control the litigation because it obligates the firm to consider conflicts of interest, 
encourages reaching settlement offers that are in the plaintiff’s interests, and forces 
the firm to ask “whether nonmonetary remedies better serve the client than do mere 
monetary damages” (emphasis added)).  This is particularly important when the 
funded parties are a public interest organization’s clients who often pursue non-
monetary relief.  See supra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining that organizations 
bring cases in areas of the law may involve interests that are not strictly monetary). 
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promote:  access to justice and private enforcement of the law.  
Realizing this unsatisfactory status quo, this Comment proposes a 
potential new solution whereby a litigation financing firm organizes 
as a benefit corporation with the goal of funding public interest 
litigation.  Additionally, it described how this model alleviates many 
of the regulatory issues and promotes a number of public policy 
benefits in the litigation-finance industry.  In this manner, the 
Comment sought to chart a legal path forward that allows public 
interest organizations and litigation financing firms to join in a 
venture that promotes access to justice and private enforcement of law. 
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